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Introduction
Economic theory grounds on the assumption of the homo oeconomi-
cus, the rational decision-maker who is only maximizing his own utility.
Economic experiments have shown many different, large, and persistent
deviations form the ideal of the homo oeconomicus. Experimental eco-
nomics5 has shown that many subjects care about fairness and the pay-
off or well-being of others, that they behave reciprocal, i.e. that they
reward cooperation and punish defection, even if this involves costs
to them. Departing from pure-self interest, behavioral economists try
to find new models and assumptions and find themselves in the ten-
sion between rational decision-making and emotional or motivational
factors guiding human behavior.
Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin (2004) write in the introductory
chapter of their book on behavioral economics that “most of the ideas
in behavioral economics are not new; [...]. Adam Smith, who is best
known for the concept of the “invisible hand” and The Wealth of Na-
tions, wrote a less well-known book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments,
which laid out psychological principles of individual behavior that are
arguably as profound as his economic observations.” (p.5 therein). In-
deed inspired by a quote from Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sen-
timents, we conducted an experiment on punishment which we present
in chapter 1. More precisely, we analyze the underlying motivation to
punish people that treated us unfair. Research in experimental eco-
nomics on punishment found that people punish offenders, even in non
repeated situations and even if it is costly. We are interested in looking
deeper into the motivation, more precisely into the personal component
of punishment. Why do people punish? Why do they want to punish?
Is it enough that the offender gets punished or is it also relevant who
punishes? In a punishment experiment, we separate the demand for
punishment in general from the demand to conduct punishment per-
sonally. Subjects experience an unfair split of their earnings from a
real effort task and have to decide on the punishment of the person
who determines the distribution. First, it is established whether the
allocator’s payoff is reduced and, afterwards, subjects take part in a
second price auction for the right to (physically) carry out the act of
5For history and overview of experimental economic see Kagel and Roth (1995).
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payoff reduction themselves. Subjects bid positive amounts and are
happier if they get to punish personally.
Early attempts to go beyond the homo oeconomicus were made by
Herbert Simon; he coined the term bounded rationality (Simon (1955)).
One model of boundedly rational behavior is the famous level-k-model
which is often used to explain behavior in the beauty contest game. In
chapter 2 we present an eye-tracking experiment on the beauty contest
game. This game has been used to analyze how many steps of reasoning
subjects are able to perform. A common finding is that a majority seem
to have low levels of reasoning. We use eye-tracking to investigate not
only the number chosen in the game, but also the strategies in use and
the numbers contemplated. We can show that not all cases that are
seemingly level-1 or level-2 thinking indeed are this low level thinking
– they might be highly sophisticated adaptations to beliefs about other
people’s limited reasoning abilities.
The last two chapters present different research projects linking
personality psychology to economics. In chapter 3 we ask the question
what a specific personality questionnaire, namely the Big Five factors,
can contribute to explain small-scale economic behavior. Whether per-
sonality variables can be used in general to understand micro-behavior
in economic games is inevident. Growing interest in using personality
variables in economic research leeds to the question whether personal-
ity is useful to predict economic behavior. Is it reasonable to expect
values on personality scales to be predictive for behavior in economic
games? It is undoubted that personality can influence large-scale eco-
nomic outcomes. However, it is less clear, whether this also holds for
micro-behavior in economic games. We discuss reasons in favor and
against this assumption and test it in our own experiment, whether
and if so which personality factors are useful in predicting behavior in
the trust game. We can also use the trust game to understand how
personality measures fare relatively in predicting behavior when sit-
uational constraints are strong. This approach will help economists
to better understand what to expect from the inclusion of personality
variables in their models and experiments, and where further research
might be useful and needed.
In chapter 4 we use personality questionnaires for a more specific
hypothesis. Knowing about huge gender differences in some of the five
factors we try to explain with this personality factors the gender gap
in women’s unwillingness to compete. There is ample evidence that
women do not react to competition as men do and are less willing to
enter a competition than men. In this chapter, we use personality vari-
ables to understand the underlying motives of women (and men) to
enter a competition or to avoid it. We use the Big Five personality
factors, where especially neuroticism has been related to performance
in achievement settings. We first test whether scores on the Big Five
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are related to performance in our experiment, and second how this is
related to incentives. We can show that the sex difference in the will-
ingness to enter a competition is mediated by neuroticism and further
that neuroticism is negatively related to performance in competition.
These results raise the possibility that those women who do not choose
competitive incentives “know” that they should not.
CHAPTER 1
Taking Punishment into Your Own Hands: An
Experiment on the Motivation Underlying
Punishment1
If the person who had done us some great injury,
who had murdered our father or our brother, for ex-
ample, should soon afterwards die of a fever, or even
be brought to the scaffold upon account of some other
crime, though it might sooth our hatred, it would not
fully gratify our resentment. Resentment would prompt
us to desire, not only that he should be punished, but
that he should be punished by our means, and upon
account of that particular injury which he had done
to us.
(Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, p.113)
1. Introduction
The desire for revenge, to punish those who did wrong upon oneself,
is a strong motivation for humans. From ancient Greek dramas to
modern movies, it is ubiquitous in story-lines. It has also been the focus
of extensive research in economics, both in the form of experiments
which find that, indeed, subjects are willing to forgo monetary gains to
exert punishment, and in the form of theoretical models that seek to
explain such behavior. However, both the quote by Adam Smith above
and many prominent fictional works2 feature a very specific form of
punishment: According to Adam Smith, humans not only care about
punishment being inflicted on the perpetrator of a crime against them,
but they also value carrying out that punishment themselves, in person.
It is this, personal, characteristic of punishment that we try to isolate in
the laboratory. Our experiment is designed to exclude other possible
reasons why one would be willing to give up money to punish. In
1This chapter comprises the paper co-authored with Peter Du¨rsch.
2To use two well known movies as examples: In Pulp Fiction, after being
rescued from a rapist by Butch, Marsellus tells Butch, who is about to kill the
rapist, to move aside, so he can shoot the rapist himself. Similarly, in Dogville,
Grace, after ordering her father’s men to torch the village which enslaved her, kills
the man who hurt her most personally, telling her father: “Some things, you have
to do yourself”.
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particular, subjects do not have to spend money to assure punishment
is carried out, they only spend money to assure it is carried out by
them personally.
Punishment has been documented in various experiments, espe-
cially in social dilemma situations where individual and group incen-
tives diverge and free-riding occurs. One of the first experiments of this
kind was conducted by Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), where
subjects who played various rounds in a common pool resource game
were willing to pay a fee to place a fine on other subjects who over-
extracted the resource. Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000a) demonstrate that
costly punishment of free-riders who do not contribute occurs in a
public goods experiment, with punishment leading to higher levels of
cooperation. Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) analyze the effectiveness
of such peer-imposed punishment in a public good game, finding that
contributions increase in the effectiveness. In contrast, Falkinger, Fehr,
Ga¨chter, and Winter-Ebmer (2000) use punishment imposed “automat-
ically” by the experimenter on non-contributers. Both peer-imposed
and experimenter-imposed punishment raises contributions. However,
subjects are not only motivated by the monetary consequences of pun-
ishment. As Masclet et.al. (2003) show, even non-monetary punish-
ment, the expression of disapproval by others, leads to the same result.
Masclet et.al. (2003) are mainly interested in the receiving side of the
punishment, but it is also interesting to investigate the decision process
of the punishing side.
Direct neuroeconomic evidence that subjects “like” to punish was
found by de Quervain et.al. (2004), who use PET recordings of brain
activation to investigate the mechanisms in the brain involved in pun-
ishment. Subjects played a trust game where cooperating players could
punish defecting partners. In the punishment condition activation of
the dorsal striatum was found, which is well known for its reward pro-
cessing properties.
This could either be due to the fact that the defecting partner lost
money or it could be pleasure derived from the act of punishing. Based
on their finding that subjects do not condition the amount of their own
punishment onto the punishment already dealt (to the same person)
by other subjects, Casari and Luini (2009), speculate in the same vein
that “the punisher derives her utility from the act of punishment in
itself and not from achieving, in conjunction with other punishers, a
total amount of punishment.”
Spurred on by the experimental observation that people do not al-
ways act purely selfish, new theories of other-regarding preferences have
been put forward, capturing phenomena like fairness, altruism, inequity
aversion. Levine (1998) uses an adjusted utility which is supplemented
by a term which takes into account the opponent’s utility weighted
by an altruism coefficient. Inequity aversion models add to the utility
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derived from own income a term that represents concern about the pay-
off distribution; Fehr and Schmidt (1999) use the difference between
the subject’s own payoff and the payoffs of the opponents, Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) the proportion of own payoff to total payoffs.
Other theories develop techniques to embed concerns for reciprocity.
Rabin (1993) models reciprocity in normal form games by adding psy-
chological payoffs to the material payoffs. This additional term cap-
tures intentions via beliefs of the players and defines the kindness of
players in relation to his possible actions. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) dilate this approach to sequential games. Falk and Fischbacher
(2006) also transform standard games into psychological games. In
their model, utility of the players depends not only on the payoffs but
also on a reciprocity term which embodies kindness and reciprocation.
All of these theories incorporate the opponent’s outcome into the
utility of the player, and several can explain reciprocal behavior or
punishment. However, we are not primarily interested in the fact that
the payoff of an offender is reduced, but especially in who will derive
satisfaction from punishing. Only the person who conducted the pun-
ishment? Or everyone who saw the offender being punished, even if
the punishment was not conducted “personally”?
Perhaps the theory closest to our design is the one by Andreoni
(1990). He examines private provision of a public good and models the
utility of the individuals as a function not only of the amount of the
public good but also of the own gift to the public good. This individual
donation produces what Andreoni calls a “warm glow”, utility derived
from the act of giving. If one assumes in almost the same manner that
the act of punishing enters the utility function, one would arrive at a
theory that could account for a demand to punish personally.
In the next section, we introduce the design we use to investigate
personal punishment. Section 3 presents our hypotheses and Section 4
the results. Finally in Section 5, we conclude with a discussion.
2. Experiment
2.1. Design. To test the demand for personal punishment, we use
three related experimental designs, 1A (one auction), 2A (two auctions)
and NC (no context).3 Table 1 shows an overview of the features of
the different designs. We start by describing 1A.
2.1.1. Design 1A. Subjects were matched in groups of four; each
group consists of three subjects A and one subject B. The experiment
was anonymous, so no subject knew about the other subjects he or
she was matched with. Instructions for the experiment, which fully
3See appendix (section 6) or online-appendix for translations of all instruc-
tion material: http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/professuren/with2/pdjm-
pp-appendix.zip
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Table 1. Experimental designs
real effort punishment auction for auction for
opportunity personal punishment dummy envelope
1A yes yes yes no
2A yes yes yes yes
NC no no no yes
described the experiment for both type A and type B, were handed
to subjects at the start of the experiment. After reading the instruc-
tions, subjects had to answer a series of detailed questions in order to
make sure that they understood the experimental instructions. Only
when all subjects had correctly answered these test questions, did the
experiment proceed.4
Figure 1. Timing
-
Instructions Test
Questions
Q 1 Stage 1 - 4 Destroy Q 2 Payment

HHHHHHH
Real
Effort
Division
by B
Decision
by A’s
Auction
In the first stage,5 all subjects A participated in a real effort task
where they could earn 10e. They were asked to fill a sheet of graph
paper (A5, 148× 210 mm, about 1260 squares) with alternating o and
+ signs. The allocated time frame was 25 minutes. Subjects who did
not finish the task in time dropped out of the experiment and received
no money apart from the show up fee. We chose this particular task
for two reasons: First, it is simple and does not require any special
abilities, so all subjects should be equally fit for the task. Second, as
we found out in previous tests, the task is considerably more exhausting
than it appears. We wanted to induce a feeling of ownership towards
the money in those subjects who completed the task. On the other
hand, it was to look easy to the non-participating subjects B. During
4Subjects who were not able to answer the test questions correctly were replaced
by extra participants (who were otherwise dismissed with a flat payment after
reading the instructions).
5The instructions use a different numbering, since we subdivided some stages for
clarity. We also handed to all subjects a flow chart as an overview what happens
in each stage. The flow charts are included in the appendix (section 6) and the
Online-Appendix.
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the task, all subjects B were sitting in the same room as the subjects
A, but without any assignment.
After the task, the experimenters collected the sheets and informed
each subject B how many subjects A in her group had succeeded. Upon
learning that information, in stage two, subject B had to decide on an
allocation of the money earned by the subjects A in the previous stage.
The only two allocations available were (2,8): 2 for A, 8 for B, or
(10,0): 10 for A, 0 for B. Subject B could only implement the same
allocation for all three subjects A she was matched with, not different
allocations for different subjects A. So in the case of three successful
subjects A subject B had to decide between 24 for herself and 2 for
each A or 0 for herself and 10 for each A.
Before stage three, the experimenters informed all subjects A about
the decision of their matched B. The money that subject B allocated
to A was handed to subject A. The money that subject B allocated to
herself was also handed to subject A, however it was put in an envelope.
Then all subjects A had to decide whether they wanted to reduce sub-
ject B’s payoff by destroying one of the three envelopes designated for
B. If all A’s decided not to reduce, the envelopes were collected by the
experimenters, handed to subject B and stage four did not take place.
If at least one subject A decided to reduce, the entire group entered
stage four. Here, all subjects A of the group took part in a sealed bid
second price auction. The highest bidder won the right to destroy the
envelope lying in front of him. Only the envelope of the winner was
destroyed.6 Note that subjects B’s payoff depends entirely on stages 1
to 3. The auction only selected the subject A who would destroy the
envelope, it did not affect subject B’s payoff. The auction provides a
non-arbitrary way to separate the decision to punish from the decision
to punish personally. Since, in a second price auction, no participant
has a reason to misrepresent his preferences, subjects are incentivized
to truthfully state the value they attach to personal punishment.
The auction winner was informed that he won the auction and
about the second highest bid he had to pay. He could then proceed
to destroy the envelope of subject B. The instructions did not specify
any mode of destruction; however a small metal bin was present on the
tables of each subject A.7 The envelopes in front of the non-winning
subjects A were collected by the experimenters and delivered to the
respective subject B.
6The minimum feasible bid was zero, the maximum feasible bid 10 and subjects
could bid in increments of 0.01 (one cent). If there was a tie, the experimenters
randomly chose a winner. This also applies to the special case of all three subjects
A choosing a bid of zero.
7The subjects chose different methods to “destroy”: Most ripped the envelope
apart – some ripped just once, some ripped until only small pieces of paper were
left – and deposited the pieces inside the metal bin. Some just folded the envelope.
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Between the test questions and the real effort task we asked some
demographics from our subjects and two questions about their happi-
ness (“how happy are you in general”/“how happy are you right now”).
After stage four and before paying, we presented subjects with a sec-
ond questionnaire asking their happiness again (only “how happy are
you right now”), their perception of subject B’s behavior and several
attitude questions8. All subjects received a 8e “show up fee” for an-
swering the questionnaires. If a subject A had won the auction and
had to pay more money than he earned in the experiment, he had to
use a part of those 8e to pay for his bid.
2.1.2. Design 2A. The 2A design is similar to design 1A, with the
difference that it uses two auctions instead of one. Stages one to three
are identical to 1A. However, in the auction stage, subjects had to
make two bids. Bid one was for the auction as described above. For
the second auction, the experimenters placed a second envelope in front
of the each subject A. The instructions stated that this envelope would
be, unless destroyed, collected again by the experimenters and would
never have any influence on the payoff of subjects A or subjects B.
That is, the second envelope is a dummy, intended to test whether
subjects would be willing to pay for destruction of any envelope. After
bids were made, the experimenters threw a coin in public to determine
whether auction one or auction two would be enacted. Only the bids
from the chosen auction did count, and only the envelope from the
auction chosen was destroyed by the winning subject A. If auction one
was chosen, the winner destroyed his envelope from auction one, the
other envelopes where handed to subject B, and all three envelopes
from auction two were collected by experimenters. If auction two was
chosen, the winner destroyed his envelope from auction two, the other
envelopes from auction two where collected by the experimenters. In
this case, the experimenters also randomly retained one of the envelopes
from auction one, such that subject B only received the same amount
of envelopes, no matter whether auction one or auction two was chosen
by the coin-flip.
2.1.3. Design NC. Finally, we used the NC condition to separate
the auction stage from the rest of our experiment. To insure that
conditions remained comparable, we conducted the control subsequent
to another, unrelated and about 1 hour long, experiment, where the
subjects earned on average 10.60e.9 This money was used to pay for
bids in the control auction. After the end of the other experiment,
we distributed the instructions for NC. Instructions and test questions
8See appendix (section 6) or Online-Appendix.
9This is close to the average earnings of 10.81e that subjects of type A had
accumulated in the other conditions (2A and 1A) before the auction was conducted.
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were as close as possible to those in the main experiment, but only
included the auction stage.10
Subjects were placed in groups of three (corresponding to our group
size of three subjects A, who did participate in the auction). The
highest bidder won the right to destroy an envelope lying in front of
him (the envelope was not payoff relevant, as in auction two of 2A).
The winner of the auction could destroy the envelope, all others were
collected by the experimenters. Auction winners were paid what they
earned in the prior experiment minus the second highest bid in their
group.
2.2. Procedures. The experiment was conducted in the labora-
tory of the economics department at the University of Heidelberg and
the laboratory of the Sonderforschungsbereich 504 in Mannheim. In
total, 149 subjects participated in the experiment (40% male, 60% fe-
male). Subjects were students of various fields at the University of Hei-
delberg and the University of Mannheim. The experiment consisted of
nine sessions; no subject participated twice. All recruitment was done
via ORSEE (Greiner (2004)).
In total, the experiment lasted slightly less than 2 hours, for which
we paid an average of 13.79e.11 The full experiment was conducted via
pen and paper. During the experiment, we used an experimental cur-
rency unit called “Thaler”. Thaler were a printed play money handed
to subjects during the experiment. At the end of the experiment, we
exchanged all Thaler into Euro at a rate of 1:1.12 All subjects were
paid in cash and private.
3. Hypotheses
According to the classic and outcome based social preference theo-
ries subjects should not care about the way in which subject B’s payoff
is reduced. On the other hand, following the reasoning put forward by
Adam Smith, subjects should care about punishing personally, so we
formulate our main hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Personal punishment: Subjects A bid more in the
personal punishment auction than in the dummy auction.
Connected to hypothesis 1 we would also expect those subjects
who punish personally to have some emotional payoff from doing so
that makes their monetary loss worthwhile.
10We used both envelopes filled with paper money and empty envelopes (the
unrelated prior experiment did not use paper money), but did not find any difference
and pooled the data.
11Only averaging over subjects in 1A and 2A.
12The main reason for using play money was that we did not want subjects to
worry about destroying legal tender.
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Table 2. Bids
Avg.(SD) Max > 0 = 0
Bid punishment auction 0.43 (1.11) 5.5 36% 64%
Wanted auction 0.51 (1.24) 5.5 46% 54%
Did not want auction 0.32 (0.93) 4.0 22% 78%
Bid dummy auction 0.03 (0.10) 0.5 17% 83%
Bid in NC auction 0.67 (1.78) 6.5 52% 48%
Row 1 to 3: subjects A’s bids in 1A and in the punishment auction in
2A. Row 4: bids in dummy auction in design 2A. Row 5: bids in design
NC.
Hypothesis 2. Happiness: Subjects A who punish personally are
happier than those who do not.
4. Results
Stages one and two of our auction designs were constructed to pro-
duce a large number of observations where punishment could possibly
occur. A first look at the data confirms that this goal is achieved. All
87 subjects A in 1A and 2A did complete the real effort task, therefore
all 29 subjects B had to make their decision for 3 matched successful
subjects A. Out of the 29 subjects B, all but 3 did implement the
allocation (2, 8), which was worse for subjects A. All three subjects B
implementing (10, 0) played in design 1A.13
Trying to find personal punishment is only viable if there is some
punishment in the first place. Given the allocation of their matched
subject B, all subjects A could chose to have the auction in stage four
implemented. Demanding the auction is equivalent to subject B being
punished, since this ensures that subject B’s payoff will be reduced by
8. In line with our expectations, subjects A who faced the “bad” (2,8)
split demand the auction significantly more often than those who got
the “nice” (10, 0) allocation (p = 0.040, one-sided Fisher-exact test).
In total, 55% of subjects A demanded the auction. Since the auction is
implemented if at least one subject A demands it, this translates into
the auction happening in 26 out of 29 groups.14
Table 2 shows the percentage of subjects A who bid a positive
amount in the ensuing auction - split into those who demanded pun-
ishment in the previous stage (that is, who wanted the auction to hap-
pen) and those who did not. Recall that bids in the auction are not
13The distribution choice of subjects B is similar to the one in a dictator
game (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986)) or ultimatum game (Gu¨th, Schmit-
tberger, and Schwarze (1982)) with a restricted choice domain.
14The three groups missing are not equivalent with the three groups where the
(10, 0) decision was implemented. While demand for the auction was lower in these
three groups, 2 subjects still wanted the auction to happen. The third (10, 0) group,
as well as 2 out of the 26 (2, 8) groups did not see the auction happen.
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payoff relevant for subject B, only whether the auction happens or not
influences the payoff of subject B. Subjects A who are either strict
money maximizers or only interested in the monetary consequences of
punishment for the matched subject B have no incentive to bid larger
than zero. In contrast to that, we find that 36% of our subjects bid
positive amounts of money. So a substantial minority of subjects is in-
terested enough in punishing personally to be willing to sacrifice some
of their own money to achieve this. While it is somewhat surprising
that we also find some positive bids of subjects who did not want the
auction to happen in the previous stage, the average bid by subjects
who wanted the auction is significantly higher (p = 0.021, one-sided
MWU test).
The positive bids in the punishment auction indicate that our sub-
jects want personal punishment, but a better test for the existence of
personal punishment is to compare the results for the two auctions in
design 2A. Here, within subject, are two identical auctions, leading to a
similar results (an envelope gets destroyed and subject B loses a payoff
of 8). The only difference is whether subjects get to destroy an un-
related envelope or the envelope belonging to subject B. A Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks test shows that bids are significantly higher in the punish-
ment auction compared to the dummy auction (p = 0.016, one-sided).15
Therefore we can not reject hypothesis 1.
Result 1. Subjects bid more in an auction for personal punish-
ment than in a dummy auction, in line with a demand for personal
punishment.
Another interesting comparison is between the auctions in 1A and
2A, where the auctions are embedded in a comprehensible context, to
the auction in NC, where we remove the context. The bids in NC
are not different from those in the auction for personal punishment
(p=0.235, MWU test, two-sided), but significantly higher than those
in the dummy auction of 2A (p = 0.006, MWU test, two-sided). Ex
ante, we would have expected the differences to be the other way round.
This points out the importance of giving subjects a context in which to
evaluate the auction. Without the proceeding stages, the auction must
15While very infrequent, there is some bidding in the dummy auction. The
answers from the subject with the highest bid in the dummy auction to an open
ended question about motivation for bidding are perhaps revealing:
(personal punishment auction): “Even though subject B is in no way affected (since
he always gets 2 envelopes), it feels good to release some pressure this way”
(dummy auction): “To erase the feeling of anger, that, even though I did the whole
work, candidate B will earn 3x as much”
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Table 3. Regression on happiness difference
regression 1 regression 2
punishment auctions dummy auction
(1A, 2A) (NC)
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
age −0.006 0.889 −0.003 0.938
(0.044) (0.036)
female −0.301 0.269 0.494 0.210
(0.270) (0.385)
(10, 0) distribution 1.150 0.019
(0.479)
wanted auction −0.108 0.674
(0.256)
bid 0.048 0.689 −0.162 0.244
(0.120) (0.136)
auction winner 0.659 0.022 0.755 0.092
(0.281) (0.432)
constant 0.020 0.985 0.086 0.934
(1.039) (1.024)
N 78 33
R2 0.195 0.119
adj. R2 0.127 −0.007
Notes: Dependent variable: happiness difference. Standard errors
in parentheses. Bid: Regression 1 uses the bids from the punish-
ment auction (1A and 2A), regression 2 from the dummy auction
(NC). In both sessions of 2A, the coin flip chose the punishment
auction, therefore the punishment auction was resolved and the
data is used in regression 1.
have made little sense to subjects in NC.16 Perhaps they were confused,
perhaps they (incorrectly) rationalized the existence of the auction with
some not-yet-announced price that would be revealed afterwards, or
maybe they felt forced to bid in the absence of any explanation. If this
experimenter demand effect (see Zizzo (2010)) exists, it is present in
our no context treatment, but not in the (similarly non-consequential)
dummy auction of treatment 2A.
Finally, we look at the result of the physical destruction carried
out by the winners of the auction. Do they enjoy the act of destroy-
ing subject B’s money? We asked all participants for their subjective
16In all designs, subjects had to correctly answer a set of test questions before
the experiment proceeded. However, the test questions only related to the mech-
anism of the auction (and the previous stages for 1A and 2A), not any possible
rational behind holding it.
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happiness on a seven point scale at the start and at the end of the exper-
iment.17 While the absolute level might depend on a number of causes
we can not control, we can use the difference in happiness between the
start and end of the experiment. Let the happiness difference be the
amount of happiness reported at the end of our experiment minus the
amount reported at the start. So subjects with a positive happiness
difference felt better after our experiment than before. Table 3 reports
two regressions on happiness difference. Not surprisingly, subjects A
who encountered the allocation (10,0) felt happier compared to those
who received only 2e from allocation (2,8). Additionally, subjects A
who went on to win the auction are happier than those who did not
win. So despite being paid less money in the end, subjects who per-
sonally destroyed subject B’s money leave the experiment happier that
those who do not, in line with hypothesis 2. The right side of table
3 reports a similar regression, now run for the subjects in design NC.
Here, winning the auction only has a weakly significant effect,18 but
the coefficient is larger.
Result 2. Subjects who won the auction for personal punishment
are happier than those who did not.
5. Discussion
In an experiment designed to separate the decision to punish per-
sonally from the more general decision to punish, we find that many
subjects bid positive amounts in a second price auction that auctions off
the right to punish personally. Some of these subjects bid substantial
amounts.
The experimental designs are constructed to eliminate a range of
other effects, which might have an influence on subjects decisions in
more general settings. Due to the one-shot nature of the experiment,
it is not possible to use bids as a signaling device for future play. Fur-
thermore, seats in the experiment were separated by blinds, so the
act of punishing was hard to use to express disapproval as in Masclet
et.al. (2003). Since punishment is the physical act of destroying (paper)
money, it might be a worry that subjects like to destroy money. How-
ever, the results of our questionnaire let us discard that thought.19 The
act of destroying the envelope is a punishment of subject B, not money
burning as in Zizzo (2003), where no strategic component was involved.
17See appendix (section 6) or Online-Appendix for the translated
questionnaires.
18Obviously, subjects in NC did not see allocations and did not decide on
conducting the auction either.
19The final questionnaire included the question “Do you like destroying
money?”. Not one of the subjects answered with yes. Additionally, subjects were
given the opportunity to destroy some of their own remaining money during the
final questionnaire. Again, none took this opportunity.
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Most importantly, the bids in the auction, and thus the willingness to
pay for personal punishment, have no influence on the payoff of the
offending subject B. Subject B’s payoff is completely determined in
stages 1 to 3. One of the mandatory test questions covered this point
to make it clear to every subject. Our decision to use a second price
sealed bid auction stems from the previous considerations. It is a fast
and incentive compatible method that lets us elicit a very fine grained
willingness to pay for personal punishment. Since the auction always
has a winner, it emphasizes the point that punishment will always oc-
cur, regardless of the bids of subjects A.
Using an auction might introduce a motivation to bid due to a “de-
sire to win”. Van den Bos et.al. (2008) find evidence for this in a sealed
bid first price auction. In one of their treatments, the opponents are
other human subjects (similar to our NC design), while in two other
treatments, subjects bid against computerized agents. Furthermore,
all subjects are taught to calculate the (risk-neutral) Nash-equilibrium
strategy, to rule out a winner’s curse effect stemming from limited cog-
nitive ability. They find that subjects playing against humans overbid
significantly more often than those playing against computers. There
is also evidence from a fMRI experiment by Delgado et.al. (2008) who
compare subjects’ reactions to losing a lottery versus losing an auction
to conclude that “The fear of losing the social competition inherent in
an auction may lead people to pay too high a price for the good for
sale”. It is possible that, in a similar vein, our subjects did not want
to “lose” the auction and therefore bid positive amounts. Our results
in NC can be seen as further evidence for such an effect. However, in
2A, we directly compare the results of two auctions. If a desire to win
exists, it should influence both auctions in a similar way, yet we find a
significant difference between the two.
We further find that subjects who win the personal punishment auc-
tion are becoming happier during the experiment compared to those
who do not win. A similar result for the dummy auction is only weakly
significant. While we can not exclude the possibility that subjects hap-
piness is only due to winning the auction, the result is also consistent
with subjects enjoying the personal punishment they achieved.
The personal punishment we address in this paper differs from an-
tisocial punishment as in Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter (2008), which
is punishing people that behaved pro-socially. In our case, when sub-
jects B decided on the distribution, they (mostly) chose the unfair
(2, 8)-split; they therefore do not behave prosocial. When we look for
antisocial punishment in our data, we find that only 2 out of 9 subjects
(22.2%), who were confronted with the fair or prosocial (10, 0)-split,
voted for punishment.
Overall, the effects we observe are significant, but not huge. This
is not surprising, since we exclude many other effects which would
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otherwise work in a similar direction. In many real life examples, the
demand for punishment and the demand for personal punishment will
be measured simultaneously. Additionally, the personal punishment, as
Adam Smith describes it, is punishment for a grave offense. For obvious
reasons, laboratory experiments can only implement minor offenses.
Yet modern justice systems might be one of the causes of unfulfilled
demand for personal punishment. By moving all aspects of punishment
into the hands of state employees and professionals, they remove part
of the satisfaction from punishment on part of those who were done
wrong. The many advantages of modern justice are obvious, but our
paper might point out a hidden disadvantage.
6. Appendix
6.1. Instructions. These instructions have been translated into
English from the Original German.
Figure 2. Overview Design 2A (handed to all subjects
in design 2A)
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6.1.1. Instructions 2A. Welcome to this experiment! Please read
these instructions20 carefully. From now on, do not talk to your neigh-
bors. Please switch your mobile phone off and keep it switched off until
the end of the experiment. If you have any questions, raise your hand
and we will come to your seat.
In this experiment, each participant will be assigned one of two
roles: A or B.
Three A and one B will be matched with each other. No participant
will ever learn the identity of the other participants.
In the experiment, Thaler will be used as the experimental currency
unit. At the end of the experiment, all paper Thaler will be exchanged
into Euro at a rate of 1 Thaler = 1e. Each participant will be paid
privately and in cash. Your payout is determined by your decisions
during the experiment and by the decisions of the participants you are
matched with.
Details of the experiment
Stage 1: Questionnaire Please complete the distributed question-
naire. In return, you will earn 8 Thaler.
Stage 2: Graph paper Each participant A is handed one sheet of
graph paper and a pen. The task is to fill that sheet with alternating
+ and − signs, as shown in the first lines. Each A will have 25 minutes
to complete this task. If the sheet is completely filled, A receives 10
Thaler. These Thaler will be handed out by the experimenters. If the
sheet is not completely filled, A earns 0 Thaler, and does not take part
in stages 3 to 7.
Stage 3: Decision of B Now, the experimenters place in front of
B the 10 Thaler of each of the three matched A. B decides on an
allocation of the Thaler received by the A in stage 2 between himself
and the A. There are two possible allocations. If an allocation is
chosen, it is implemented for all A. It is not possible for B to choose
different allocations for different A.
Allocation (2,8): 2 Thaler for A and 8 Thaler for B
Allocation (10,0): 10 Thaler for A and 0 Thaler for B
If B chooses allocation (2,8), he places 8 Thaler in each envelope
and leaves 2 Thaler outside of the envelope. In this case, each A receives
those 2 Thaler. The 8 Thaler in the envelope are designated for B. If
B chooses allocation (10,0), he places 0 Thaler in each envelope and
leaves 10 Thaler outside of the envelope. In this case, each A receives
those 10 Thaler. No Thaler are designated for B.
Stage 4: Transfer Now, the envelope and the Thaler outside the
envelope are placed in front of each A – as per the allocation chosen
by B.
20Subjects in the experiment received the instructions in another, clearly ar-
ranged format and page layout than the one displayed here.
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• Each A can take the Thaler outside the envelope and combine
them with the 8 Thaler he earned in stage 1.
• The envelope must not be opened. The envelope contains
those Thaler, which B designated for himself.
Stage 5: Decision of As Each A decides on the following question:
“Should one of the envelopes of stage 3 be destroyed?“
If B chose the allocation (2,8) in stage 3 and if at least one A
answers with yes, then Bs payout will be reduced by 8 Thaler. If all
A answer the question with no, then stage 6 (auctions) does not take
place, and the payout of B is not reduced.
Stage 6: Auctions The experimenters distribute a new envelope to
each A. This envelope contains the same number of Thaler as are in
the envelope of stage 3. Neither A, nor B will ever receive any Thaler
out of the new envelope.
There are two auctions, auction1 and auction2. Auction1 relates to
the envelope of stage 3, auction2 relates to the new envelope.
Each A has to make a bid for both auctions. Only one of the two
auctions will be implemented. A coin toss will decide which auction
will be implemented. The coin toss will be made after bids have been
collected.
This is how both of the auctions work:
Each A states the number of Thaler he is willing to bid (you can also
bid in Cent). The lowest possible bid is 0 Thaler, the highest possible
bid is 10 Thaler.
The A who entered the highest bid wins the auction. However, the
winner only has to pay the second highest bid in this auction. This
cost will be deducted during the payout at the end of the experiment.
If there are several, equally high, highest bids, the winner will be ran-
domly determined. This means that there is always a winner in the
auction.
Note: In this type of auction, it is optimal to bid just the amount that
is equivalent to your valuation of the good (here: the right to destroy
the according envelope) that is auctioned off.
In each of the two auctions, the winner earns the right to destroy
one envelope:
In auction1, each A bids for the right to destroy the envelope in front
of them from stage 3. Only the winner of the auction may destroy the
envelope. B does not receive any Thaler out of the destroyed envelope
of the winner.
In auction2, each A bids for the right to destroy the newly dis-
tributed envelope. Only the winner of the auction may destroy the
envelope. Newly distributed envelopes which are not destroyed are
collected again by the experimenters. Nobody does ever receive any
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Thaler out of the destroyed or not destroyed newly distributed en-
velopes.
Stage 7: Result of the auction In this stage, a coin toss determines
whether auction1 or auction2 will be resolved. The winner of the chosen
auction may destroy his envelope and the Thaler in that envelope.
If the coin toss chooses auction1, the two envelopes of stage 3 which
are not destroyed are handed to B. B may open the envelopes and take
the Thaler within them. All newly distributed envelopes are collected
by the experimenters.
If the coin toss chooses auction2, two of the envelopes of stage 3 are
handed to B. B may open the envelopes and take the Thaler within
them. One randomly chosen envelope of stage 3 is retained by the
experimenters and not handed to B. All newly distributed envelopes
which are not destroyed are collected by the experimenters.
Stage 8: Questionnaire Finally, please complete the second dis-
tributed questionnaire.
Payment Now, all Thaler are exchanged into Euro.
Payout A: All A own the Thaler placed in front of them. That is,
the 8 Thaler received in stage 1 as well as the Thaler received in stage
4. The winner of the auction that was chosen by the coin toss has to
pay the second highest bid in this auction.
Payout B: B owns the 8 Thaler received in stage 1 and all Thaler
out of the envelopes of stage 3, with exception of any destroyed envelope
or any envelope retained by the experimenters.Nobody receives Thaler
out of the newly distributed envelopes from stage 6.
6.1.2. Instructions 1A. Welcome to our experiment! Please read
these instructions carefully. From now on, do not talk to your neigh-
bors. Please switch your mobile phone off and keep it switched off until
the end of the experiment. If you have any questions, raise your hand
and we will come to your seat.
In this experiment, each participant will be assigned one of two
roles: A or B.
You are in the role of A [B]21 for the entire experiment.
Three A and one B will be matched with each other. No participant
will ever learn the identity of the other participants.
In the experiment, Thaler will be used as the experimental currency
unit. At the end of the experiment, all paper Thaler will be exchanged
into Euro at a rate of 1 Thaler = 1e. Each participant will be paid
privately and in cash. Your payout is determined by your decisions
during the experiment and by the decisions of the participants you are
matched with.
21Subjects A and B received the same instructions, only at this position stating
their role.
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Figure 3. Overview Design 1A (handed to all subjects
in design 1A)
Stage
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
questionnaire 1
8 Thaler (independent of stage 2 and 3)
“A”s: graph paper
completed
failed 0 Thaler, “A” will not 
take part in stage 3-6 
10 Thaler
“B” devides these 10 Thaler
A:2  B:8 A:10  B:0
i ii
Transfer
2 Thaler for “A”, 10 Thaler for “A”, 
8 Thaler in the envelope 0 Thaler in the envelope 
“A”s decide
all: noat least 1: yes
auction happens no auction
“A”s bid 
winner:destroys envelope
questionnaire 2
Details of the experiment
Stage 1: Questionnaire Please complete the distributed question-
naire. In return, you will earn 8 Thaler.
Stage 2: Graph paper Each participant A is handed one sheet of
graph paper and a pen. The task is to fill that sheet with alternating
+ and − signs, as shown in the first lines. Each A is allowed to spend
maximal 25 minutes to complete this task.
If the sheet is completely filled, A receives 10 Thaler. These Thaler
will be handed out by the experimenters. If the sheet is not completely
filled, A earns 0 Thaler, and does not take part in stages 3 to 7.
Stage 3: Decision of B B decides on an allocation of the Thaler
received by the A in stage 2 between himself and the A. There are two
possible allocations. If an allocation is chosen, it is implemented for all
A.
i) 2 Thaler for Aand 8 Thaler for B
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ii) 10 Thaler for Aand 0 Thaler for B
In the first case each A receives 2 Thaler. B receives 8 Thaler for
each A who still takes part in stage 3 (that means 24, 16, 8 or 0 Thaler
when 3, 2, 1, 0 A’s are still participating).
In the second case, each A receives 10 Thaler and B receives 0
Thaler in total.
Stage 4: Transfer The experimenters allocate the Thaler according
to the decision of B. Each A receives:
• The Thaler that B allocated to him.
• The envelopes must not me opened. The envelope contains
those Thaler, which B designated for himself.
Stage 5: Decision of A’s Each A decides on the following question
and notes this on decision sheet A:
“Should one of the envelopes be destroyed?“
In case of allocation i) this will reduce Bs payout by 8 Thaler.
If all A answer the question with no, then stage 6 (auctions) does
not take place, and the payout of B is not reduced.
Stage 6: Auction All three, with the exception of those who dropped
out in stage 2, take part in this auction. Out of the three envelopes
exactly one will be destroyed, two will remain. Each A can bid for the
right to destroy his own envelope with the included money which B
would receive from him. Only the winner of the auction may destroy
the envelope. B will not receive any Thaler out of the envelope of the
winner.
This is how the auction works: Each A states the number of Thaler
he is willing to bid on decision sheet A (minimum 0 Thaler, maximum
10 Thaler, step size 0.01 Thaler). The A who entered the highest
bid wins the auction and obtains the right to destroy his envelope.
However, the winner has to pay the second highest bid. This cost will
be deducted during the payout at the end of the experiment. There
will always be a winner of the auction. If there are several , equally
high, highest bids, the winner will be randomly determined.
Note: In this type of auction, it is optimal to bid just the amount
that is equivalent to your valuation of the good (here: the right to
destroy the envelope) that is auctioned off.
Stage 7: Result of the auction The winner of the auction may
now destroy his envelope and the Thaler in that envelope in arbitrary
manner. Afterwards, the envelopes of those A who did not win the
auction will be handed to B. B may open the envelopes and take the
Thaler within them.
Stage 8: Questionnaire Finally, please complete the second dis-
tributed questionnaire.
Payment Now all Thaler are exchanged into Euro.
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All A own the 8 Thaler received in stage 1 as well as the Thaler
received in stage 4. The winner of the auction has to pay the second
highest bid in the auction.
B owns the 8 Thaler received in stage 1 and all Thaler out of the
envelopes of stage 3, with exception of the destroyed envelope.
6.1.3. Instructions NC. In this experiment, you are, together with
two other participants, in a group of three people. No participant will
ever learn the identity of the other participants.
In front of every participant is an envelope. In this experiment, the
right to destroy this envelope is auctioned off.
Auction All three participants take part in this auction. Out of the
three envelopes exactly one will be destroyed, two will remain. Each
participant can bid for the right to destroy his own envelope. Only the
winner of the auction may destroy the envelope.
This is how the auction works: Each participant states the number
of Euro he is willing to bid on the decision sheet (minimum 0 Euro,
maximum 10 Euro, step size 0.01 Euro). The participant who entered
the highest bid wins the auction and obtains the right to destroy his
envelope. However, the winner has to pay the second highest bid. This
cost will be deducted during the payout at the end of the experiment.
There will always be a winner of the auction. If there are several,
equally high, highest bids, the winner will be randomly determined.
Note: In this type of auction, it is optimal to bid just the amount
that is equivalent to your valuation of the good (here: the right to
destroy the envelope) that is auctioned off.
Result of the auction The winner of the auction may now destroy
his envelope in arbitrary manner. Afterwards, the envelopes of those
participants who did not win the auction will be collected by the ex-
perimenters.
Payment The winner of the auction has to pay the second highest bid.
All other participants pay nothing.
6.2. Test Questions.
6.2.1. Test Questions 2A. Question 1: What payment will you
receive at the end of the experiment, if you are A and you do not
manage to fill out the complete graph paper.
Question 2: As A, you are bidding 2 Thaler in one of the auctions.
The second A bids 0 Thaler and the third A bids 3.40 Thaler.
a) Who wins the auction and may destroy an envelope?
b) How much does the winner have to pay?
Question 3: Assuming all As were successful in stage 2 and B did
decide on the allocation (2, 8) in stage 3. Look at stage 5 and 6. What
is the only case in which the payout of B is not reduced by 8 Thaler?
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Question 4: You are B. All A did fill out the complete paper in
stage 2 and you did decide on the allocation (2, 8). The As decide they
want the auction. In the auction chosen by the coin flip, the As are
bidding exactly as in question 2. What is your payout at the end of
the experiment?
Question 5: You are B. 2 out of 3 As did fill out the complete paper
in stage 2 and you did decide on the allocation (10, 0). All As decide
against the auction.
a) What payout will you receive at the end of the experiment?
b) What payout will those As who completed the paper receive?
c) What is the payout of the A who did not complete the entire
paper?
Question 6: Assume that auction 1 is chosen by the coin flip. Which
A has to pay something? Which bid does this A have to pay?
6.2.2. Test Questions 1A. Question 1: What payment will you
receive at the end of the experiment, if you are A and you do not
manage to fill out the complete graph paper.
Question 2: As A, you are bidding 2 Thaler in the auction. The
second A bids 0 Thaler and the third A bids 5 Thaler.
a) Who wins the auction and may destroy the white envelope?
b) How much does the winner have to pay?
Question 3: Assuming all As were successful in stage 2 and B did
decide on the allocation 2 Thaler for each A and 8 Thaler for B in
stage 3. Look at stage 5 and 6. What is the only case in which the
payout of B is not reduced by 8 Thaler?
Question 4: You are B. All A did fill out the complete paper in
stage 2 and you did decide on the allocation (2,8). The As decide they
want the auction. In the auction chosen by the coin flip, the As are
bidding exactly as in question 2. What is your payout at the end of
the experiment?
Question 5: You are B. 2 out of 3 As did fill out the complete paper
in stage 2 and you did decide on the allocation 10 Thaler for each A
and 0 Thaler for B. All As decide against the auction.
a) What payout will you receive at the end of the experiment?
b) What is the payout those As who completed the paper will
receive?
c) What is the payout of the A who did not complete the entire
paper?
6.2.3. Test Questions NC. Question 1: You are bidding 2 Euro in
the auction. A second participant bids 0 Euro and the third participant
bids 5 Euro.
a) Who wins the auction and may destroy the envelope?
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b) How much does the winner have to pay?
Question 2: Can it happen that in a group no one of the three par-
ticipants destroys his or her envelope?
Question 3:
a) Assume you bid 0 Euro in the auction. What payout will you
receive for this part of the experiment?
b) Assume you bid 1,50 Euro in the auction and your bid is the
highest bid, the second highest bid is 1 Euro What payout will
you receive for this part of the experiment?
6.3. Questionnairs.
Questionnaire 122
How happy are you in general?
(very unhappy) o o o o o o o (very happy)
How happy are you at the moment?
(very unhappy) o o o o o o o (very happy)
How old are you?
What is you gender?
Are you a student?
If yes: What is you major?
Questionnaire 223
How happy are you at the moment?
(very unhappy) o o o o o o o (very happy)
[ONLY ROLE A] How did you perceive Bs behavior in stage 3?
(not fair) o o o o o o o (fair)
(not nice) o o o o o o o (nice)
(not comprehensible) o o o o o o o (comprehensible)
(not rational) o o o o o o o (rational)
(not selfish) o o o o o o o (selfish)
In general, do you like destroying money?
o true o not true
I am always fair to others, even if I am at a disadvantage because of it.
o true o not true
I think fairness is an exceptionally important characteristic of humans.
o true o not true
I dislike taking responsibility.
o true o not true
22Questionnaire 1 and 2 were identical in designs 1A and 2A. The questionnaires
in NC were nearly identical, we only dropped some questions, because they were
not relevant (the questions about behavior of player B).
23In design 2A we had some additional questions regarding the bidding behav-
ior. We asked subjects to explain why they choose to bid or not to bid, how they
chose their bid and finally, to judge the likelihood to win the auction with their bid.
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I rarely hit back, even if someone else hits me first.
o true o not true
If someone hits me first, I’ll show him.
o true o not true
If I am angry I occasionally bang doors shut.
o true o not true
If someone angers me, I tend to tell him what I think about him.
o true o not true
Even if I don’t show it, I am sometimes consumed with envy.
o true o not true
If someone does not treat me right, I do not let it get at me.
o true o not true
Before we pay out the money, you have the possibility to destroy an
arbitrary amount of your own Thaler lying in front of you. Do you
want to destroy Thaler?
o Yes, Thaler o No, I don’t want to destroy my own Thaler.
CHAPTER 2
More than Meets the Eye: An Eye-tracking
Experiment on the Beauty Contest Game1
1. Introduction
The beauty contest game is frequently used to analyze the depth of
strategic thinking of ordinary people. In this game all players have to
state a number between 0 and 100 simultaneously. The payoff is a fixed
amount for the winner; all other players get nothing. The winner of
the game is the person whose chosen number is closest to the mean of
all chosen numbers multiplied by a predetermined positive parameter.
(If more than one person chooses the same number the prize is divided
equally among the winners.) The game has only one unique Nash
equilibrium: all players pick zero. This equilibrium can be reached via
several steps of either iterated elimination of dominated strategies or
iterated best response.
Empirically, however, players usually do not state zero, but rather
choose a number that indicates only one or two iterations; in other
words, people seem to apply only low levels of reasoning. This is,
however typically only inferred from the numbers stated. Another pos-
sibility is that people in fact have higher levels of reasoning, but after
getting through many steps of iterated reasoning, decide that others
might not be as smart and therefore choose a number being interpreted
as showing only low levels of reasoning.
We used eye-tracking to get a deeper understanding of how peo-
ple choose the number they state in the guessing game. Eye-tracking
has recently been used in economic experiments to distinguish between
different possible decision processes leading to similar results (see e.g.,
Arieli, Ben-Ami, and Rubinstein (2011), Knoepfle, Wang, and Camerer
(2009), Wang, Spezio, and Camerer (2010), Reutskaja et.al. (2011)).
Eye-tracking technology records what the subject is looking at. The
assumption underlying the use of eye-tracking is that people tend to
look at data they process. Our design permits us to investigate the pro-
cedures that subjects use in choosing a number. While following their
eye movements, we first presented the rules of the game for a fixed time
span and then a number ray from 0 to 100. Knowing which numbers
subjects looked at informs us which numbers subjects contemplated in
1This chapter comprises the paper co-authored with Christiane Schwieren.
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the beauty contest game. Monitoring the sequence of numbers consid-
ered in the thinking process gives us a deeper insight into the strategies
used.
We find that the evidence with respect to levels of reasoning is
less clear than has so far been assumed. We find different strategies
that look similar when just focusing on the stated number: Choosing
a number associated with level-1 or level-2 reasoning can in fact be the
outcome of level-1 or level-2 reasoning, but it can also be the outcome
of higher level types adjusting their chosen number to their beliefs of
what other people might do. In many cases we discover that subjects
contemplate choosing low numbers and later go back and choose a
number consistent with level-1 or level-2 reasoning.
We cannot reject with our data that some people only engage in
level-1 or level-2 reasoning, but we can show that not all cases that
are seemingly level-1 or level-2 thinking indeed are – they might be a
form of highly sophisticated adaptation to beliefs about other people’s
limited reasoning abilities.
2. The beauty contest game
2.1. Definition of the game. The beauty contest game was first
mentioned by Keynes (1936) and later introduced formally by Moulin
(1986).2
In this game each of n players, n ≥ 2, simultaneously choose a
number xi from a given interval, usually [0, 100]. The player whose
chosen number is closest to p times the mean of all numbers xi, i =
1, . . . n, wins a fixed and known prize. If there is a tie among m players
with m ≤ n, then the prize is divided equally among them. All other
players get nothing. The value of the parameter p is common knowledge
before the game starts.
2.2. Nash equilibrium and dominance. For p with 0 ≤ p < 1
there exists only one Nash equilibrium: all players announce zero.3
The beauty contest game is dominance solvable and was originally
experimentally tested in the laboratory to see how many steps of rea-
soning subjects are performing. Iterated elimination of dominated
strategies starts in the first step with the elimination of all numbers
larger than 100p and then those larger than 100p2, 100p3 and so forth.
An infinite number of steps will lead towards zero, the only undomi-
nated number and the unique equilibrium point of the game. People
2For the history of the beauty contest game see Bu¨hren, Frank, and Nagel
(2009).
3The uniqueness of the equilibrium is only true for beauty contest games where
players can choose a real number out of the interval; if only integer numbers are
allowed there are multiple equilibria; see Lo´pez (2001) for a characterization of
these.
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have inferred the level of reasoning by the number of steps of elimi-
nation of dominated strategies, identifying a choice as level k if it is
included in the interval [100p(k+1), 100pk].4
2.3. Level-k models. Deviations from Nash equilibrium play have
been widely demonstrated and one of the approaches to model this be-
havior is often referred to as the “level-k”- or “cognitive hierarchy”-
model (e.g. Nagel (1995), Stahl and Wilson (1995), Costa-Gomes,
Crawford, and Broseta (2001), Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004), Ho,
Camerer, and Weigelt (1998), Crawford and Iriberri (2007a), Crawford
and Iriberri (2007b) ). The key assumption here is that, departing
from the idea of complete rationality and consistency in strategies and
beliefs, one allows for a hierarchy of beliefs or differing depths of rea-
soning. All variants model step by step reasoning with heterogeneous
types, where the number of steps define the level of reasoning, think-
ing or sophistication. All models have in common that the depth of
strategic thinking is incorporated into the number of applications of
a best response procedure that subjects do. So in general, level-k is
defined by best responding to level-k − 1. The level-0 type is defined
differently: playing uniformly distributed over the given interval or the
choosing of a focal strategy.
2.4. Experimental results. The beauty contest game has been
used in various experiments in the laboratory and in the field. The first
experiments on the beauty contest game showed quite unambiguously
that most players do not play the unique Nash equilibrium especially
in the first round. From the perspective of iterated elimination of dom-
inated strategies, this means that players do not perform the infinite
number of iterated eliminations leading to zero. Instead Nagel (1995)
proposed in her first experimental study on the beauty contest game a
model of boundedly rational behavior to explain the behavior observed
in the first period.5 This model of iterated best reply with limited elim-
ination captures the following types of players: level-0-players choose
randomly between 0 and 100, level-1-players best reply6 to this with
50p, level-2-players choose 50p2 (a best reply to level-1) and level-3-
players choose 50p3. The experimental results of Nagel (1995) fit well
to this model: for p = 1/2 and p = 2/3 no one picked zero and the aver-
age chosen numbers are 27 and 36, respectively. Many subjects perform
4One could also use other classifications since choosing numbers lower than
100p(k+1) may also be a best response given type-k’s beliefs.
5There are also models for the other periods, after subjects got feedback. We
do not concentrate on these learning models, because in our experiment we gave
no feedback and are not interested in learning.
6Breitmoser (2010) shows that 50p is not in general a best reply to uniformly
randomizing players, but that the best reply significantly differs when the number
of players is low compared to an approximately infinite number of players.
2. THE BEAUTY CONTEST GAME 29
one step of reasoning, choosing 33 with p = 2/3, or 2 steps, choosing
22. Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998) were the first to replicate these
main findings, and analyze different learning models for games where
feedback was given.
Building on these first experiments, others (for a survey, see Nagel
(1999), Camerer (2003a), Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2010))
varied different aspects of the game, like the number of players, repe-
titions, or the payoff. The results with respect to first round behavior
are always quite clear. The Nash equilibrium (zero) is reached in less
than 2.5% of the cases, and a proportion of 5 to 25% of the players
play a dominated strategy, i.e. choose a number between 100p and
100. Inferring the level of iterated dominance from the data, all stud-
ies find relatively low levels: the modal level is two, and there are only
few subjects with a level higher than 3 (less than 5%). Going from
the laboratory to the field, Bosch-Domenech et.al. (2002) corroborate
the results in large newspaper-based experiments. In addition to play-
ing the game, participants of their experiments were asked how they
chose their number. By classifying these answers, the authors were
able to find different types of reasoning processes. They find five dif-
ferent types: two of them use a game theoretic argument (fixed point
argument and iterated elimination of dominated strategies), two types
use arguments mentioned in the beauty contest game literature (where
the first type starts his analysis with the mean of 50 and then uses the
reasoning described above and the other type is best replying to a prob-
ability distribution of types) and the last type, called “experimenter”,
conducts his or her own experiments with friends to find out what
they are doing. Additionally Bosch-Domenech et.al. (2002) introduce
a classification of those subjects who reason until equilibrium, but then
choose non-equilibrium strategies. In a neuroeconomic study Coricelli
and Nagel (2009) identify different neural substrates of subjects with
low and high levels of reasoning.
Psychologists use the term theory of mind to describe the ability
to understand other minds. Ohtsubo and Rapoport (2006) review the
beauty contest game (and the investment game) and assume that one
underestimates the depth of reasoning, because subjects may perform
many steps of the iteration towards the equilibrium solution and even
figure it out, but then state a higher number because they think that
the n − 1 other players are not as smart as they are. Therefore, in
the beauty contest game, high levels of reasoning and a theory of mind
of the other players can cause a number associated with low levels of
reasoning. The same number could be reached by truly low levels of
reasoning.
There are attempts to use other data than choices to learn more
about the decision process underlying choices. Costa-Gomes, Craw-
ford, and Broseta (2001) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) used
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MouseLab to ascertain information search behavior. Verbal data also is
used to get more information on the reasoning of subjects, for example
Nagel (1993), Bosch-Domenech et.al. (2002), Sbriglia (2008), Burchardi
and Penczynski (2011). So far, there is one other experiment that
has used eye-tracking together with the beauty contest game. Chen,
Huang, and Wang (2009) introduce a two-person beauty contest game
played spatially on a two-dimensional plane. The authors classify sub-
jects into various types, based on choices and on eye-tracking data.
They find that more than half of the subjects are classified in the same
class by both procedures, and that some subjects are classified into a
higher level-k-type using the eye-tracking data than using the choice
data. But as they use the two-person game, we aim to show that a
similar result can also be verified with the standard beauty contest
game.
3. Experiment
3.1. Method. We recorded subjects’ eye movements using the
EyeLink II Eye-tracking System made by SR Research Ltd./Canada.
The EyeLink II is a head mounted video-based eye tracker. It con-
sists of three miniature cameras mounted on a padded headband. Two
eye cameras allow binocular eye-tracking or easy selection of the sub-
ject’s dominant eye without any mechanical reconfiguration. An opti-
cal head-tracking camera integrated into the headband allows accurate
tracking of the subject’s point of gaze. We used a chin rest to inhibit
movement of the subjects.
3.2. Design and Procedures. Subjects played six rounds of a
repeated one-shot beauty contest game with no information or feedback
in between rounds.
Table 1. Values of p used in the experiment
round 1 2 3 4 5 6
p 0.125 0.2 0.33 0.5 0.66 0.75
They had to choose a number out of the interval [0, 100]. Sub-
jects chose a number by saying it aloud. They were instructed that
when viewing at the screen shown in figure 1 they should think about
which number to choose and then pronounce the number chosen. Us-
ing eye-tracking technology it is important that subjects focus on the
monitor; and therefore, typing in the chosen number on the keyboard
is impossible.
The different parameters were always presented in the same order
as shown in table 1.
The number of players n was ten, but subjects came one by one
to the eye-tracking laboratory. Each subject was informed that he was
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Figure 1. Screen when subjects choose the number (ex-
ample of round 5, parameter 0.66 is shown in the upper
right corner)
playing with nine other players who either had already played or would
play later, up to reaching ten players in total.7 The design of our ex-
periment differs from most other beauty contest games in laboratories,
but it is very similar to the design by Coricelli and Nagel (2009), be-
cause the needs of the eye-tracking technology are comparable to the
needs of neuroeconomic experiments. We also use the same parameters
as Coricelli and Nagel (2009), but the order of parameters differs.
For each subject we first determined his or her dominant eye. We
fixed the head-mounted system and chose the respective camera. After
fixing the system comfortably on subjects’ head the experiment started
with a calibration phase. Only after reaching a good fit we proceeded
with the experiment. First subjects saw a general instructing screen
telling that the experiment will now start. Then subjects saw the
specific instructing screen telling how to determine the target number.
For each round of the beauty contest game the exact timeline of events
on the monitor was as follows: First subjects were informed about the
parameter; they saw the number in two formats, i.e. as 0.66 and in
percent (66%). This screen was followed by a calibration to secure
exact measurement for the following trial. Subjects saw the number
ray (together with the parameter, see figure 1) and knew that they
now should choose the number for this round. They could think about
which number to choose without any time restrictions, and finally had
to press any key on the keyboard to proceed to the next round.
7Translated instructions of the experiment can be found in the appendix 6.2
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The experiment was conducted in December 2009 and March 2010
in the eye-tracking laboratory of the Psychology Department of Hei-
delberg University. We had 39 subjects in total8. Participants were
students of various fields of study. Subjects received the general part
of the instructions at the beginning of the experiment and could ask
questions.
The fixed prize of each round in the beauty contest game was
10e and we paid all rounds. The experiment lasted for about 30 min-
utes. Participants earned e16.01 on average. All subjects were paid
in cash and in private. Subjects were paid after all ten players had
played.
4. Results
4.1. Behavioral results. Because we ran six rounds of the beauty
contest game, we have 231 decisions9 in total. For the first analysis we
do not treat rounds differently and do not take learning into account,
as we gave no feedback and no information between rounds. We do
analyze the data on subject level later.
In table 2 we list the mean and median of the chosen numbers.
Table 2. Mean and median of the chosen numbers
p = 0.125 p = 0.2 p = 0.33 p = 0.5 p = 0.66 p = 0.75
N 39 38 38 38 39 39
Mean 29.72 34.79 39.84 41.68 46.41 46.72
Median 24 30 35 40.5 45 39
If we compare the chosen numbers with the typical number choices
in other experiments, we find that our subjects chose somewhat higher
numbers. For example our mean of 46.41 (for p = 0.66) is definitely
larger (t-test two-tailed,t =2.839, p=.007) than the mean of 36 reported
in Nagel (1995). Figure 2 gives an overview of the distribution of
number choices for the different parameters of p we used. None of our
subjects chose zero, which is in line with the usual laboratory finding
that only very few people chose the Nash equilibrium - and if the Nash
equilibrium is chosen then it usually happens in later rounds, after
learning from feedback.
For analyzing how many subject choose a weakly dominated strat-
egy we are going to look for chosen numbers larger than 100p. The
frequency of the choices greater than 100p for the different parameters
p can be found in table 3. For the larger parameters we find the usual
8Originally we had eye-tracking data of 40 subjects, but we excluded one subject
from the analysis who was familiar with the beauty contest game.
9We should have 6× 39 = 234 decisions, but for one subject three decisions are
missing, because they got not recorded.
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Figure 2. Number choices
(a) p = 0.125 (b) p = 0.2
(c) p = 0.33 (d) p = 0.5
(e) p = 0.66 (f) p = 0.75
percentage, around 20 to 25% choose dominated strategies, while for
the smaller parameters we have more subjects choosing a dominated
strategy.
Table 3. Choice of weakly dominated strategies
p = 0.125 p = 0.2 p = 0.33 p = 0.5 p = 0.66 p = 0.75
N 39 38 38 38 39 39
Frequency 26 26 22 10 9 6
Percent 66.7% 68.4% 57.9% 26.3% 23.1% 15.4%
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4.1.1. Levels. We use two different methods to calculate levels of
reasoning using only the chosen number. We use one level-k model
which determines the level of k by 100pk and a second model that
determines the level by 50pk. To determine the level of thinking by the
chosen number xip (in the round with parameter p) we choose the k
resulting in the smallest quadratic distance
QDi = (xi − 100pk)2 or QDi = (xi − 50pk)2.
An array of frequencies and percentages for the calculated levels for
each parameter can be found in tables 4 and 5.
Using both methods of calculation we find that a majority of sub-
jects have low levels of reasoning. With the level-k model using 100 as
a starting point and with the level-k model using 50 respectively, we
find levels strictly larger than three in about 13% respectively 6% of
cases, which is close to the usual fraction (below five percent for the
level-k-50) mentioned in the literature (2.3). Clearly, one gets differ-
ent, but similar levels by using differing methods of estimating levels.
For the rest of the paper we assign levels using the level-k model using
50. We chose this method because it is more frequently used in the
literature, and we mainly use the idea of the number of steps that indi-
cate the level of reasoning in the following analyses. However, nothing
substantial would change with respect to our results using the idea of
iterated elimination as the basis for defining levels.
So far we have calculated the levels of reasoning for each round
of the beauty contest game. Now we attempt to assign one level of
reasoning to each of our subjects. 5 of our 39 subjects show the same
level for all different parameters, and if we decide the level by majority
rule10 we can assign a unique level to 26 subjects. Three more subjects
have level-0 in half of the cases and level-1 in the other half, so these
subjects would have either level-0 or level-1. For three subjects we find
clearly increasing levels from the first to the last round. We can not
assign one level to these subjects, but can classify them as “learners”.
(Recall that we give no feedback between the different rounds of the
game, but Weber (2003) found in his experiments with the beauty
contest game that players seem to learn even in conditions without
feedback by mere experience. Subjects played 10 rounds of the beauty
contest game and were exposed to the same parameter (p = 2
3
).) There
remain only seven subjects that we cannot classify.
10This means that we assign, for example, level-2 to a subject if he showed level-
2 in at least four out of six choices. In this assignment of levels we follow Coricelli
and Nagel (2009) who used the same rule to determine levels on subject-level based
on their choices.
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The distribution of levels can be found in table 6. Comparing this
assignment of levels by subject with the levels assigned by decision we
can conclude that the main pattern persists: We find few subjects with
high levels (namely only three subjects with levels strictly larger than
level-3 or in total only four subjects with level-2 or higher) and the
majority of subjects has level-1 (10 subjects) or level-0 (18 subjects).
Table 6. Levels per subject
by majority tie learner
level frequency level frequency level frequency
0 18
1 7 0 or 1 3
2 1
3
4 0 to 5 1
5 1 to 5 1
6 1 to 6 1
? 7
That a majority of our subjects seem to have low levels of reasoning
replicates the findings of many beauty contest games with different
parameters and with different subject pools11 in the literature.
4.1.2. Strategic IQ. To have a unique measure for each participant
we finally calculated a “strategic IQ” for each subject as first intro-
duced by Bhatt and Camerer (2005). We based our calculation on
the procedure developed by Coricelli and Nagel (2009). We employ
the quadratic distance of choices to the winning numbers. We then
calculated the winning numbers for each round using a recombinant
estimation method (compare Mullin and Reiley (2006) and Mitzkewitz
and Nagel (1993)).
We have a measure of strategic IQ for each round and take the
average over the rounds to generate one aggregate measure of strategic
IQ.
Additionally we asked our participants, as a proxy for intelligence,
to provide their grade in the “Abitur” (the German High-school diploma)
and for their grades in Mathematics and German separately. None of
these three measures correlates with our measure of strategic IQ.
The measure of strategic IQ yields low values for high strategic
reasoning and high values for low strategic reasoning. We see in figure
3, which shows the distribution of strategic IQ, that most subjects have
a rather high value on the strategic IQ measure. This is in line with
the rather low levels of reasoning we find.
11Only game theorists and self-selected newspaper readers show higher levels
and pick the equilibrium more often, see Camerer (2003a).
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Figure 3. Strategic IQ for each subject, ordered by the
level assignment as listed in table 6
4.2. Eye-tracking results. So far we have used only the chosen
numbers to relate our data to the existing literature on guessing games.
In the following, we will use our eye-tracking data to analyze the deci-
sion process of our participants.
4.2.1. Data analysis. While our subjects could choose any number
between 0 and 100, with eye-tracking we are not able to identify exact
numbers (like 33), but rather areas a subject focused on, e.g., around
30.
Therefore we analyze the data using interest areas. We divide the
number ray equally into rectangular interest areas: around zero, around
ten, around twenty, . . . , around hundred and one interest area parame-
ter, which captures when subjects looked at the parameter of the round,
which we presented alternating in one of the upper corners.
For the analysis of our data we mainly use fixations. Fixations are
states where the eye is in relative motionlessness. To define a state as
a fixation we use the preset definitions of the Eyelink II System.
4.2.2. Reaction Times. Remember that subjects pronounced the
number they chose in one round of the beauty contest game, and then
had to press any key on the keyboard in front of them to proceed to
the next round. We use the duration of a given round of the beauty
contest game between the onset of the screen and the pressing of the
key as a proxy for the reaction time.
The average duration of a round of the game was 14832 milliseconds.
Average durations seperately for each round can be found in table 7.
Although we do not provide feedback, subjects seem to become familiar
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with the game in the sense that they are able to decide faster in later
rounds.
Table 7. Duration for the different rounds
round parameter duration
1 p = 0.125 28538
2 p = 0.2 16942
3 p = 0.33 15000
4 p = 0.5 9301
5 p = 0.66 8971
6 p = 0.75 9225
4.2.3. Use of number ray and parameter. As we gave subjects the
necessary information about the game before the number ray appeared,
subjects could essentially have closed their eyes to think about the given
problem, without looking at the number ray or even at the screen at all.
But we can see that subjects do use the number ray. They do not look
randomly (uniformly distributed) across the whole screen, but use the
available information in a systematic way. Fixations are either on the
number ray or on the parameter p, given in one of the upper corners.
Subjects used the information given by the parameter while they
decided. In table 8 one could find the percentage of fixations in the
interest area parameter while subjects saw the number ray and decided
which number to chose. Subjects use this information more in the
early rounds, which is in line with the declining reaction times for later
rounds.
Table 8. Fixations in the interest area parameter
round parameter percent
1 p = 0.125 21.9
2 p = 0.2 22.6
3 p = 0.33 18.7
4 p = 0.5 12.0
5 p = 0.66 13.4
6 p = 0.75 12.5
4.2.4. Comparison of number stated and last contemplated number.
As a control for the feasibility of our design we tested whether subjects
at the end of each round looked at the number they chose in that
round. As we could not identify exact numbers we interpret when a
subject looked at the corresponding area as looking at the number,
i.e. a subject stating 27 should have a last fixation in the interest area
thirty. We find that in 67.9% of the cases subjects looked at the number
they choose. This might seem like a relatively small percentage, but
our design might provide an explanation for this.
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As we did not set a time constraint per round it is possible that
the remaining fraction of subjects stated the number not at the very
end of the round (i.e., right before pressing a key to continue), but
rather stated the number and then kept watching the number ray for
a while before pressing a key to proceed to the next round. We also
calculated, therefore, in how many of the remaining cases subjects had
a fixation in the respective interest area among the last five fixations
in that round. In total, 85.5% of the cases fulfill this relaxed criterion.
4.2.5. Hot Spots. Hot spots were analyzed seperately for each of
the six rounds and seperately for both locations of the parameter (in
the left or the right upper corner). In table 9 we listed the average
total number of fixations seperately, for parameter in the left corner
(first row) and right corner (second row).
Table 9. Total number of fixations at each interest
area, averaged across subjects, 1st row: parameter left,
2nd row: parameter right (in bold: the two largest num-
bers)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 p
1 1.21 7.08 10.37 8.83 12.62 14.71 7.46 3.04 1.67 2.08 2.33 20.04
1 1.13 6 6.53 6.13 7.73 9.46 7.8 6 1.93 2.33 1.73 22.67
2 0.83 2.13 4.22 3.09 3.30 7 2.78 2.22 1 0.69 1.04 11.39
2 0.06 2 4.31 6.69 8.44 8.87 7.19 3 1.87 0.87 0.43 13.12
3 0.21 1.37 2.25 6.25 6.67 9.46 6.58 3.08 2.17 1.42 0.46 7.71
3 0.27 1.53 2.67 5.07 3.33 7.33 3.47 1.6 1.13 0.6 0.8 12.07
4 0.13 1.13 3.13 2.87 3.22 6.48 2.96 1.04 0.26 0.35 0.17 5.34
4 0.06 0.69 2.94 5.31 6.75 5.69 3.19 1.87 3 0.81 0.12 2.75
5 0 0.5 2.79 3.21 3.92 5.29 4.08 2.08 0.71 0.21 0.29 4.5
5 0.14 1.86 4.07 2.28 3.07 4 3.36 3 2.07 1.43 0.28 7.93
6 0.09 2.09 1.76 3.05 1.95 4.14 3 3.86 1.95 0.81 0.14 4.81
6 0.23 0.53 2 3.88 5.41 5.53 2.41 2 1.65 2.06 0.59 4.88
In most rounds the maximum number of fixations is in the interest
area of the parameter. The second highest number of fixations is at
around 50. Most people seem to use 50 as an anchor when choosing
their number. Recall however that our fixation point was in the middle
of the screen, thus being in the interest area of 50. This might have
drawn people to this focal point rather than to 100. Most other hot
spots are below 50, which is a hint that people behave in line with a
level-k model rather than according to dominance.
4.2.6. Best reply model. Using the eye-tracking data we could trace
which numbers subjects contemplated while deciding which number to
choose. 55 of the 234 decisions, that is 23.50% of the choices, were
made looking only at numbers below 50. This is an indication that
the decision was made in a way described by a level-k model, starting
with 50 as the average of random choices (exact statements about the
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starting point are contaminated by the fixation in the middle before
the rounds; compare the analysis of the Hot Spots).
On the subject-level only one person looked only at numbers below
50 (for all the six choices); for seven subjects this was the case in three
or four out of the six choices (see table 10). Only 11 of our 39 subjects
never followed this pattern. Most of our subjects seem to decide – at
least for some of their decisions – following a level-k model.
Table 10. Fixations only below 50
choices out frequency percent
of all 6
6 1 2.6%
5 0 0%
4 1 2.6%
3 6 15.4%
2 8 20.5%
1 12 30.8%
0 11 28.2%
4.2.7. Classification. Our main interest regarding the eye-tracking
data is to test the hypothesis that levels are estimated too low when
only taking the chosen number into account. Using the chosen number
alone one can not distinguish between a process of a certain, low num-
ber of iterations leading to the chosen number from a process of more
iterations resulting in a lower number (closer to zero), choosing at the
same time a higher number (as with less iterations) because of the be-
liefs about the opponents’ choices. We also expect to learn something
about the decision process in more general terms.
Therefore we are interested in the following category, which we
name sophisticated. A classification as sophisticated indicates that
there is more information than given by the chosen number. This clas-
sification requests a level-k reasoning process: starting at some number,
going step-wise into the direction of the equilibrium and stopping at
some number. But then, the subject now goes up again and chooses a
number higher than the lowest contemplated. The information given by
the level assigned through the chosen number is missing some informa-
tion: more steps in the direction of the equilibrium, that is more levels
of reasoning, have been made than indicated by the chosen number.
For a classification one could start with a very loose definition, we
simply assess how many subjects used lower numbers in their decision
process than the number they state. A comparison of lowest contem-
plated number and chosen number leads to 64.53% of the decisions that
are such that subjects contemplated lower numbers than the number
they choose. But satisfying this criterion need not automatically mean
4. RESULTS 42
that subjects are sophisticated, it could also be that they choose ran-
domly and just for some reason look at a lower number than the number
they chose.
To avoid an over-classification with a simple definition as above
we use the following, more rigorous classification rule. Subjects are
classified sophisticated depending on a precise pattern of eye-tracking
data, which is described in the following. In the reasoning process
for choosing the number subjects must follow a level-k-type analysis
which means that they perform steps leading towards zero, ending at
some lowest contemplated number. Instead of stating this number, the
subject goes up again and states a number greater than the lowest
contemplated number. This indicates that the subject has completed
more steps towards the equilibrium or has a higher level than the level
interfered from the chosen number.
To be precise, in the eye-tracking data we require that the sub-
ject started at some number and went stepwise in the direction of the
equilibrium, that is downwards. That means we must have a sequence
of fixations starting at higher and going to lower numbers. We also
require that the ending points of this downward reaching analysis are
lower than the chosen number.
If we use this classification we can classify 21.37% of our observa-
tions as sophisticated.
Splitting our analysis by the level we calculated merely from the
number choice we could conclude that the result for the sophisticated -
observations was driven mainly by the lower levels. Of the level-0
observations (by chosen number), 19.8% were indeed sophisticated, of
the level-1 observations 32.9% were sophisticated, but of the higher level
observations, none could be classified as sophisticated.
So far we classified the decisions. It would be desirable to also have
a classification on subject level. We find that 4 of the 39 subjects,
that is 10.3% have no decision classified as sophisticated, so these can
easily be called non-sophisticated. All other have at least one decision
classified as sophisticated : 23 (59.0%) have one decision, 9 (23.1%) have
two and 3 (7.7%) have three, no subject has more than three. But
what exactly does that tell us about a classification as sophisticated
on subject level? This question is not simple to answer. It is not clear
that a subject should be classified as sophisticated if and only if all six
decisions are classified sophisticated. Maybe it is enough to have one
sophisticated decision process, and using the insights gained during
that decision process in all further decisions? Most of the decisions
classified sophisticated were decisions in early rounds, to be precise
in the first and second round. There are only 3 decisions classified
sophisticated in later rounds. So it indeed seems that the subjects
engage in this sophisticated reasoning once (ore twice) and then in
later rounds just apply it and directly stop at the “chosen” level.
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5. Conclusion
We used the beauty contest game with eye-tracking to obtain novel
data on the decision process. Until now laboratory studies on the
beauty contest game have used the chosen number to assign levels of
reasoning to subjects or used comments by the subjects. We attempted
to classify a subject not only by using the chosen number, but also using
the eye-tracking data we recorded while subjects decided which number
to choose.
While on a behavioral level (using only the chosen number) we
could replicate the finding that a majority of people seem to apply
low levels of reasoning, using the eye-tracking data we find that more
than 20% of the observations fall into our sophisticated -category. In
these cases, subjects seem to do more steps of reasoning than indicated
by the chosen number. This happens mainly in the first two rounds.
Assigning them a “true level” leads to a higher level than the level
assigned by using the chosen number. We find these subjects mainly
among our seemingly low-level subjects. We therefore conclude that
more people are reasoning in a more sophisticated manner than one
might think.
In our experiment, as it is standard when categorizing people, some
subjects remain uncategorized. Also other econometric models, e.g.
mixture models, find around 30% of random players, see for example
Bosch-Domenech et.al. (2010). The fact that in our study subjects
remain uncategorized is partially due to the strictness in our catego-
rization. We request a very specific pattern in the eye-tracking data to
file an observation in that category. It would have been nice to be able
to better understand what drives level-0 behavior, but even with the
eye-tracking data we cannot draw clear conclusions, clear patterns do
not arise. The reason for that might be that we cannot detect simple
heuristics people use with our method (e.g., choosing their birthday
or street number). One additional aspect of our results is that most
subjects seem to use 50 as the focal point to start with. This can be
partially influenced by our method, as the fixation point was in the
middle of the screen and thus in the interest area of 50, but on the
other hand subjects usually used the parameter in the beginning and
from there they could theoretically have been drawn anywhere - even
to zero and 100, which we do not find.
Using eye-tracking, we were able to learn more about people’s de-
cision processes and their strategic abilities compared to conducting
the experiment without eye-tracking. Our results are good news for
economists in that they show that people are more strategically so-
phisticated than behavioral data on the guessing game has suggested
so far. It is also good news for those promoting the use of eye-tracking
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and similar methodology, as by using this method we were clearly able
to gain additional insights relevant to economists.
6. Appendix
6.1. Conduction of a session. Before handing out the instruc-
tions to the subject we gave him or her some information about the
eye-tracking method, written down on a sheet of paper with illustra-
tions. We informed the subject about the timeline of the eye-tracking
session and how we would set up the head mounted system and the
camera. Moreover we told the subjects not to move while being eye-
tracked.
6.2. Instructions. These instructions have been translated into
English from the original German.
Please read these instructions carefully and ask the experimenter if
you have any questions.
6.2.1. Part 1. You are taking part in a game, in which you will play
along with nine other participants. This game has six rounds. Parts
of the instructions you will get on the screen while the experiment is
running.
decision. In each round you have to choose a number between 0 and
100 (for example 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , 54, 55, . . . , up to 99, 100).
Payoff. Your payoff will be determined as follows: in each round
the person who chooses the number closest to a target number, re-
ceives e10. If two persons choose the same number, the prize will
be divided equally between these participants. All other participants
receive nothing.
Target number. During the experiment you will learn how to deter-
mine the target number.
Information. In between the rounds you will get no information
about the outcome of the previous round.
Timeline of one round. On the monitor you will see
(1) the instructions. After reading the complete instructions please
press any key to continue.
(2) how to determine the target number. Here the program pro-
ceeds automatically.
(3) a representation of the numbers from 0 to 100. Please think
now which number you would like to choose to get as close
as possible to the target number. You do not have any time
constraints. When you have decided on the number, state the
number and then press any key on the keyboard to continue.
Then you will proceed to the next round. In total there are six rounds.
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6.2.2. Part 2. In this part you will play another game12, which is
unrelated to the first part of the experiment. You will get the instruc-
tions for this game during the experiment.
6.3. Questionnaire. About the first part of the experiment (tar-
get number)13
(1) What would you expect that the other participants decided?
(2) Did you have a strategy? If so, what was it?
(3) Do you have any further comments on the first part?
General questions:
Please tell us which grades you received in your Abitur (the German
High-school diploma)
• in Math
• in German
• your Average Grade
12We report this data separately.
13We also had similar questions about the second part of the experiment.
CHAPTER 3
What Can the Big Five Personality Factors
Contribute to Explain Small-scale Economic
Behavior?1
1. Introduction
Recently, a growing interest among (behavioral) economists in per-
sonality variables can be observed (e.g., Almlund et.al. (2011), Dohmen
et.al. (2010), Borghans et.al. (2008)). In most published studies in-
volving personality measures so far, the Big Five personality factors
are used. Usually, correlations of the personality measures with some
real-world aspects of economic behavior are reported and interpreted,
for example with earnings or performance on the job. 2 Researchers
in experimental economics recently also started to include personal-
ity measures in experiments, hoping to be able to explain part of the
behavioral heterogeneity found. Many studies relate some kind of Big
Five personality variables, although measured by different instruments,
to behavior in games like the Prisoner’s dilemma, dictator, or ultima-
tum games (e.g., Brandsta¨tter and Gu¨th (2002), Ben-Ner, Kong, and
Putterman (2004), Ben-Ner et.al. (2004), Swope et.al. (2008)). Other
studies use more specific scales, as locus of control, self-monitoring
and sensation seeking (Boone, De Brabander, and Van Witteloostuijn
(1999)), or the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Schmitt et.al. (2008)).
Results of these exercises so far are not very conclusive.
One reason for this might lie in a methodological concern: Is it rea-
sonable to expect values on personality scales to be predictive of micro-
behavior in economic games? It is undoubted that personality can in-
fluence economic outcomes at large (Ozer and Benet-Mart´ınez (2006)),
such as occupational attainment (Filer (1985)) or occupational perfor-
mance and success (Barrick and Mount (1991), Seibert and Kraimer
(2001)). Whether personality variables can also be used to understand
“micro”-behavior in economic games is however less clear.
In this paper, we discuss reasons in favor and against this assump-
tion and test in our own experiment, whether and which personal-
ity factors are useful in predicting behavior in the trust game (Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995)). We can also use the trust game to
1This chapter comprises the paper co-authored with Christiane Schwieren.
2See for example Barrick and Mount (1991); Mueller and Plug (2006).
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understand how personality measures fare relatively in predicting be-
havior when situational constraints are strong. This approach will help
economists to better understand what to expect from the inclusion of
personality variables in their models and experiments, and where fur-
ther research might be useful and needed.
The aim of this paper is exploratory, and due to this, our method
is somewhat non-standard: We use the NEO-PR-I (Costa and McCrae
(1992)) to measure the Big Five personality factors and link scores
with behavior in a trust game, both of trustor and trustee. To find the
relevant predictors we use in our regressions the method of backward
stepwise elimination (Eid, Gollwitzer, and Schmitt (2010)). We do this
on two levels – first, on the level of the five factors, and then also on
the level of sub-scales. Here we follow an argument by Paunonen and
Ashton (2001) who propose to look at sub-scales (facets) as well for
predicting behavior, because they are more specific and therefore more
apt to explain small-scale behavior.
To preview our results, first, we can show that behavior of player 1 is
more strongly determined by personality than behavior of player 2. Sec-
ond, our analysis of subscale-correlations can tell us something about
the trust-game in general. We discuss these results on the background
of our aims, to get an idea of when personality matters and whether us-
ing personality as an additional explanatory variable is recommendable
for (experimental) economists, and how this could be done.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section
2, we give an overview of the literature on personality measurement.
Then, we describe our experimental design (section 3) and the person-
ality measures (section 3.2) used in more detail. Section 5.2 presents
the results for player 1’s behavior and section 5.3 those for player 2’s
behavior. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes.
2. Measurement of Personality
Personality psychology provides a large set of specific measures of
potential interest for economists. On the one hand, there are general
models of personality, comprising usually between four and seven gen-
eral factors of personality (e.g., Goldberg (1981); Cloninger, Svrakic,
and Przybeck (1993); Cattell and Schuerger (2003)). These are mea-
sured with different scales, varying in the content of the factors and
the sub-factors measured. The most famous example is the NEO-PR-I
measuring the so called Big Five Personality Factors (Costa and Mc-
Crae (1992)). On the other hand, there are more specific measures,
capturing certain aspects of personality like anxiousness or aggressive-
ness. Here, we focus on the general measures and use the NEO-PI-
R (Costa and McCrae (1992)), German: (Ostendorf and Angleitner
(2004)) to measure the Big Five personality factors.
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Researchers in personality psychology discuss whether personality
factors can be expected to correlate strongly with real life outcomes
and behavior, and whether it would be problematic if this were not
the case. Since Mischel (1968), many personality psychologists argue
that there is a ceiling of a correlation of .3 between personality vari-
ables and real life outcomes, the so called .3 barrier (Mischel (1968);
see also McCrae (1982) for exceptions). Researchers that adhere to
this ceiling argument put forward that the situation is at least as or
more important in determining behavior and important life outcomes
as is personality. Others (e.g., Ozer (1985)) however argue that .3-
correlations are not so small and can have important practical effects
and that most social, psychological (and even medical) variables, like
socioeconomic status or cognitive ability do on average not correlate
any stronger with important life outcomes. It is noteworthy that usu-
ally the outcomes studied are larger-life outcomes, such as divorce,
occupational or educational attainment, and not “micro”-behaviors as
trust-game behavior. An exception to this is research in organizational
behavior that links, for example, locus of control or conscientiousness
to individual performance, turnover decisions etc. (e.g., Judge and
Bono (2001); Allen, Weeks, and Moffitt (2005); Dudley et.al. (2006)).
Most researchers argue that personality influences outcomes in life not
in a direct way, but rather affects general tendencies to act, e.g., to
continue an education or to be persistent despite failures, which then
influences the developmental path over the life span.
We therefore do not expect to be able to explain behavior in the
trust game by a single personality factor. We do however think that
if personality is indeed something important influencing behavior, it
should at least somewhat contribute to an explanation also of small-
scale behavior, especially when the situation does not provide much
guidance on how to behave.
3. Experimental Design and Procedure
The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory of
SFB 504 in Mannheim. We had 138 subjects in total (57 male, 70
female, the remaining failed to indicate their sex). All subjects par-
ticipated in two sessions with one week in-between. The experiment
consisted of 12 independent sessions in the first week and 12 sessions
in the second week. In total, the experiment lasted for about one hour
in the first and one hour in the second week. Subjects had filled in the
personality questionnaires before our experimental sessions, which took
them about 2 hours. We paid subjects at the very end of the experi-
ment, i.e. after the session in the second week. Part of these earnings
were performance-based, and part was fixed: both in week one and two
they received a show-up fee of e5, and they received a fixed amount
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of e14 for filling in the personality questionnaires. Parts of the ex-
periment (the questionnaires) were conducted via pen and paper and
parts (the games) were programmed and conducted with the software
z-tree (Fischbacher (2007)). All subjects were paid in cash and private.
Subjects knew about the whole timing in advance, at the beginning of
each session they received instructions containing the curse of events of
the session. For each of the games and the decisions instructions were
distributed and also read aloud in each part by the experimenter and
participants had a chance to ask questions.
3.1. The Trust Game. Players were randomly assigned to be ei-
ther player 1, the trustor, or player 2, the trustee. Two players were
randomly matched together. Both players got 10 units of an experi-
mental currency. The trustor could first decide whether or not to sent
units to player 2, if he sent x units (x ≤ 10), these units got tripled.
Then player 2 got informed about the amount she received and she
could decide to send an amount y (y ≤ 10+3x) back to player 1 (these
units were not tripled). Therefore the payoff for both players were
determined by
(1) player 1 : 10− x+ y player 2 : 10 + 3x− y.
At the end of the experimental currency was transformed into Euro
with an exchange rate of 1 Euro =0.3 ECU.
3.2. The Big Five. To measure personality we use the five-factor
model or the “Big Five” (Goldberg (1981), McCrae and Costa JR
(2003))).
This model organizes personality traits in five basic dimensions:
neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness and
conscientiousness.3 A list of the personality dimensions and their facets
measured by the Big Five model can be found in table 1.
We use the NEO PI-R (Costa and McCrae (1992)), German version
(Ostendorf and Angleitner (2004)) to measure the Big Five personality
factors. It consists of 241 items which have to be rated on a 5-point-
Likert-scale.
4. Behavioral Predictions
As this paper is exploratory in character, we do not test specific
hypotheses but rather explore how personality is related to behavior
in the trust game. We did however formulate predictions that we will
explain in the following. The basis for our predictions is on one hand
the analysis of the situation both players in the trust game are in.
3There are other labels for the five factors, we use the names by Costa and
McCrae (1992).
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Table 1. The five factors and their facets (NEO-PR-I),
acronyms in parenthesis
Factor Facets
Neuroticism (N) Anxiety (N1), Angry Hostility
(N2), Depression (N3), Self-Con-
sciousness (N4), Impulsiveness
(N5), Vulnerability to Stress (N6)
Extraversion (E) Warmth (E1), Gregariousness (E2),
Assertiveness (E3), Activity (E4),
Excitement-Seeking (E5), Positive
Emotions (E6)
Openness to Experience (O) Fantasy (O1), Aesthetics (O2), Feel-
ings (O3), Actions (O4), Ideas (O5),
Values (O6)
Agreeableness (A) Trust (A1), Straightforwardness
(A2), Altruism (A3), Compliance
(A4), Modesty (A5), Tender-
Mindedness (A6)
Conscientiousness (C) Competence (C1), Order (C2),
Dutifulness (C3), Achievement-
Striving (C4), Self-Discipline (C5),
Deliberation (C6)
On the other hand, we rely on the literature in personality psychology
to derive predictions about which personality factors should be most
important for behavior of player 1 and of player 2 in the trust game.
First, we derive hypotheses for the link between personality factors
and behavior, i.e. we hypothesize in what way a subject with a certain
personality will behave in the trust game.
Neuroticism refers to the tendency to experience negative emotions
and feelings, especially anxiety and general distress. Therefore we
would expect that a person with high neuroticism-scores to be anx-
ious and to avoid the risk of not getting the money back.
Prediction 1. Higher levels on neuroticism will correlate with
lower amounts sent by player 1.
With respect to extraversion and openness to experience, we do not
have clear-cut predictions regarding behavior in the trust game.
Agreeableness is defined as being compassionate and cooperative,
the names of the facets are rather self-explanatory. Agreeableness is
linked to cooperative behavior (Volk, Tho¨ni, and Ruigrok (2011); LeP-
ine and Van Dyne (2001)). This leads to the following intuitive predic-
tion:
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Prediction 2. Higher levels on agreeableness will correlate with
higher amounts sent by player 1 and with higher amounts returned by
player 2.
People high on conscientiousness act planned not spontaneous, are
dutifully and self-disciplined. Therefore we could imagine that high lev-
elsconscientiousness will lead to higher amounts sent by player 1 (being
dutiful) if a norm for sending is salient. As conscientiousness is also
linked to rationality (D’Zurilla, Maydeu-Olivares, and Gallardo-Pujoi
(2011), Witteman et.al. (2009)) and high levels of could conscientious-
ness as well lead to lower amounts sent by player 1 (being rational).
For player 2, we assume the norm of reciprocity to be salient and thus,
controlling for player 1’s sending we expect trustors that are high on
conscientiousness to follow this norm dutifully, and thus to send back
more.
Prediction 3. Higher levels on conscientiousness of player 1 might
lead to more or less sending. For player 2, we assume that high con-
scientiousness-scores lead to higher returns.
The reason to select the trust game for our research is that it con-
tains two different situations (for player 1 and 2 respectively) that can
be described in terms of a distinction often made in personality psy-
chology: the distinction between weak and strong situations (Mischel
(1977)). In weak situations, the behavioral triggers stemming from
the situation are weak, and therefore personality variables should con-
tribute significantly to an explanation of behavior. In strong situations
on the contrary, situational triggers of behavior are strong and there-
fore personality variables should not contribute much to an explanation
of behavior if player 1’s behavior has been controlled for.
For player 2, the situation she finds herself in is relatively clearly
determined: Player 1 has either trusted her with a certain amount of
money and now she has to decide how to react to this. As is known
from the experimental literature, reciprocity is a strong norm prevail-
ing in this context (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995); McCabe,
Rassenti, and Smith (1998); Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000b); McCabe, Rig-
don, and Smith (2003)). Player 1 however faces a situation where
norms or guidances for behavior are not that clear. Personal tendency
to trust or to take risks will determine how much of the money he will
send to player 2.
Prediction 4. First players find themselves in rather weak situ-
ation, therefore personality variables should contribute significantly to
an explanation of behavior. Second players are in a rather strong situ-
ation, therefore personality variables should not contribute much to an
explanation of behavior if player 1’s behavior has been controlled for.
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5. Results
5.1. Behavior in the Trust Game. Figure 1 shows the distri-
bution of the amount sent by player 1 in the trust game.
Figure 1. Trust – Amount Sent by Player 1
60 subjects played the trust game in the role of player 1, and the
mean amount sent by player 1 is 4.3. This is slightly below what is
usually reported. Usual results are that player 1 sends on average half
of his endowment and trust is not repaid by player 2 (e.g., Camerer
(2003b)).
Returns show an absolute average of 5.9, and are strongly correlated
with offers (r = .736). Figures 3(a) shows absolute returns. The
relation between the amount sent by player 1 and the amount returned
by player 2 can be found in 3(b), the red line indicates where the
amount sent is equal to the amount returned. Above the red line, trust
is repaid by player 2.
5.2. Personality measures and trustors behavior. Generally,
we find reasonable variance in our personality scales4, even though one
might assume at least with respect to some of the scales that a student
population might be comparably homogeneous. Scores on all five of the
personality measures are normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test of normality).
As a first step to test our predictions we calculate correlations of
first player behavior (and later second player behavior) with the per-
sonality factors. We report correlations in the first column of table 2.
This table also shows intercorrelations of the personality measures.
4For descriptive statistics of the personality scales see table 7 in appendix 7.2.
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Figure 2. Trustworthiness – Player 2
(a) Amount Returned by Player 2
(b) Trustworthiness – Amounts sent and returned
As conjectured in predictions 1 and 2, sending of player 1 correlates
significantly negative with neuroticism, and significantly positive with
agreeableness.
Next we look at subscales (facets) and also calculate correlations
here. We only report significant correlations.
We analyze the facets of the two factors that correlate with trustor
behavior, neuroticism and agreeableness. Anxiety (N1), angry hostil-
ity (N2), and depression (N3) correlate significantly (negative) with
sender behavior among the subscales of neuroticism. Of the subscales
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Table 2. Correlations between x, the amount sent by
player 1, and the personality factors
x N E O A C
N -0.339∗∗ 1.000
0.009
E -0.052 -0.331∗∗ 1.000
0.697 0.011
O 0.199 -0.102 0.404∗∗ 1.000
0.134 0.446 0.002
A 0.284∗ -0.071 0.146 0.133 1.000
0.031 0.596 0.274 0.318
C -0.258 -0.210 0.233 0.010 -0.078 1.000
0.050 0.113 0.078 0.938 0.561
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and .1% level respec-
tively. Abbreviations: N = neuroticism, E = extraversion, O =
openness to experience, A = agreeableness, C = conscientiousness
of agreeableness, trust (A1) correlates significantly positive with the
amount sent by player 1, and so does straightforwardness (A2).
Table 3. Correlations between x, the amount sent by
player 1, and the personality facets of neuroticism and
agreeableness
x
N1 −0.377∗∗
0.003
N2 −0.319∗
0.015
N3 −0.280∗
0.033
N4 −0.211
0.111
N5 −0.078
0.559
N6 −0.123
0.358
x
A1 0.370∗∗
0.004
A2 0.314∗
0.016
A3 0.167
0.210
A4 0.150
0.262
A5 −0.007
0.958
A6 0.172
0.197
Although having an intuitive appeal, altruism (A3) does not cor-
relate with behavior of the trustor. There is a discussion about other
motives than trust that are included in the trust game; Cox (2004)
points out that not only trust and trustworthiness, but also altruistic
preferences can account for sending by player 1 or returning by player
2. From the personality variables involved in player 1’s decision, only
trust, but not altruism has an influence on the amount sent by the first
player.
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After this first results, which personality factors and facets have an
influence on the amount sent by player 1, we now turn towards the
regression analysis.
Here, we use a modeling approach that is often used in exploratory
studies (e.g., Eid, Gollwitzer, and Schmitt (2010)): Backward stepwise
elimination of insignificant predictors. In the first step we include all
predictors that correlate with behavior of player 1 and also the con-
trol variables in a regression. We then stepwise eliminate always the
least significant predictor until we get a model that consists only of
significant predictor variables. This exploratory way of modeling is in-
dicated in our case as most of the personality variables we study are
inter-correlated. A model including all potentially relevant personality
variables therefore underestimates the explanatory power of each of the
variables, due to multicollinearity. By doing a step-wise elimination of
insignificant predictors, we reach a model where only the most inclusive
and important personality variables remain.
Table 4. Regression on x, the amount sent by player 1
Variable model I model II model III model IV
N −0.292∗∗ −0.320∗∗
(0.024/0.032) (0.022/0.011)
N1 −0.327∗ −0.316∗∗
(0.121/0.063) (0.082/0.011)
N2 0.047
(0.124/0.782)
N3 0.032
(0.126/0.859)
A 0.261∗∗ 0.261∗∗
(0.025/0.042) (0.024/0.037)
A1 0.238 0.213∗
(0.114/0.112) (0.099/0.099)
A2 0.243∗ 0.235∗
(0.109/0.075) (0.100/0.061)
age −0.071 −0.102
(0.113/0.572) (0.111/0.410)
sex −0.061 −0.041
(0.989/0.650) (0.999/0.760)
n 58 58 58 58
R2 0.1902 0.1827 0.2830 0.2719
adj. R2 0.1291 0.1530 0.1826 0.2314
Note: beta, SE/p-value in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
For the trustor we explain the amount sent in two different ways
using the Big Five personality variables: in the first approach we use
the factors correlating individually with the behavior of the first player
(table 2) and in the second approach we use the facets of this factors,
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and again only the facets correlating individually with the behavior of
the first player (table 3).
Table 4 shows all four models (model I and II – factor-approach,
model III and IV – facet-approach). In model I, the factors neuroti-
cism and agreeableness, together with the controls are included, step-
wise elimination leads to model II. In both models neuroticism has
a significant negative impact on the amount sent and agreeableness a
significant positive impact. These models explain 13% to 15% of the
variance in the amount sent by the first player. Using facets, signifi-
cant predictors are anxiety (N1) and straightforwardness (A2), again
signed as before: a negative impact of the neuroticism-facet and a pos-
itive impact of the agreeableness-facet. The explained variance is 18%.
In model VI, all insignificant predictors have been excluded, and the
remaining predictors are those that had been significant before, and
trust (A3) having also a positive impact. This model explains an even
larger part of the variance in player 1’s behavior, around 23%.
Anxiety is defined5 as the level of free floating anxiety and has been
linked to risk averse behavior in different domains6, so it is intuitive
that this facet has a negative impact on the amount sent by player 1.
The positive influence of trust highlights again that the trust game is
indeed about trust: trust being defined as the belief in the sincerity
and good intentions of others has a positive impact on the amount
sent by player 1. Finally, straightforwardness is defined as frankness
in expression, in general a person high on straightforwardness is rather
frank, sincere, and ingenuous, than manipulative or deceptive.
5.3. Trustee Behavior. We now turn to the behavior of the sec-
ond player. As described before, there is one clear difference between
predicting first player’s behavior and predicting second player’s behav-
ior: behavior of player 2 will most probably be guided by reciprocal
incentives, i.e., what the first player has sent to the second player will
matter. We thus have a strong situation here, as opposed to the weak
situation in which first players find themselves in. In line with the
general search for interactions of personality variables and the environ-
ment in personality psychology, our main question is whether person-
ality variables predict beyond “material”, situational characteristics,
or whether it is only player 1’s behavior that predicts the responses of
player 2.
We start again with correlations. If we take data of all trustees,
the only and highly significant predictor of player 2’s behavior is the
amount player 1 sent to her (0.731, p = 0.000), we find no correlation
5All facet-definitions following Costa and McCrae (1992).
6Nicholson, O’Creevy, Soane, and Willman (2005) analyze personality and risk
propensity in different domains and find anxiety being linked to less risk taking in
recreation, career, and safety.
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at all between behavior of player 2 and any of the personality factors
or of the sub-factors, i.e., the situation determines behavior stronger
than do personality variables.
Table 5. Regression on y, the amount returned by
player 2
Variable model I model II
sent 0.737∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗
(0.169/0.000) (0.160/0.000)
Sex −0.56
(1.322/0.546)
Age 0.049
(0.280/0.592)
n 61 64
R2 0.540 0.534
adj. R2 0.516 0.527
Note: beta, SE/p-value in parenthesis; *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
Including these variables in a regression on the return of player 2,
the results in table 5 again highlight that only the amount that player
1 has sent to player 2 explains the amount player 2 returns.7
In an attempt to give personality variables the best opportunity to
have an effect, we look at only part of our sample, namely those second
players who received high offers in the trust game, where high offers
are defined8 as offers of at least five. We are aware of the fact that
analyzing this sub-sample leads to a small number of observations, but
due to the exploratory character of this study we still give personality
variables this chance.
As expected, personality factors have some influence on behavior in
the case where player 1’s sending has been reasonable and fair: On the
factor-level we still find no correlations, but on facet-level modesty (A5)
correlates negatively with the amount returned (−0.415, p = 0.035),
while competence (C1) correlates positive (0.399, p = 0.044).
A positive relationship between a conscientiousness-facet is in line
with prediction 3. This is also generally coherent as contentiousness
is defined as the degree of organization, control and goal directed be-
havior, the facet competence measures the belief in own self efficacy
7Sometimes it is argued that one should only analyze those second players that
received positive amounts from the first player, because players receiving zero are
forced to also sent back zero. Repeating our analysis only with those subjects that
received strictly positive amounts we find structurally the same results as shown in
table 5.
8This definition of high conveys the definition of Blanco, Engelmann, and Nor-
mann (2011) for high offers in an ultimatum game.
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which could intuitively be linked to higher amounts returned. In con-
trast, a negative relationship between modesty and the amount return
is very unintuitive. Modesty is defined as a tendency to play down
own achievements and be humble. Because of the small sample size we
had a closer look at this result. A visual inspection and detection of
extremes demonstrated that some subjects with low scores on modesty
returned very high amounts. Analyzing this observations more detailed
we declared two of the observations as outliers. After dropping this two
observations there is no longer a significant correlation between mod-
esty and the amount returned. Therefore, modesty is not included into
the following regression.
Table 6. Only for high amounts received: regression on
y, the amount returned by player 2
Variable model I model II
sent 0.449∗∗ 0.497∗∗
(0.776/0.048) (0.561/0.004)
C1 0.222
(0.436/0.311)
Sex −0.063
(3.140/0.756)
Age 0.090
(0.507/0.646)
n 25 31
R2 0.310 0.247
adj. R2 0.172 0.221
Note: beta, SE/p-value in parenthesis; *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
Including the facet competence in a regression together with the
amount sent by the first player and controls for age and sex, in the
full model again only the amount sent is significant, and 17% of the
variance is explained, while after step-wise exclusion of insignificant
predictors, the amount sent by the first player remains the only sig-
nificant predictor in the model, and the model explains 22% of the
variance.
So even in this case where we gave personality its best chance: the
situation determines behavior.
6. Discussion
To answer the question to what extent personality can contribute
to explain small-scale economic behavior we decided to use the trust
game as an example.
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There are other studies relating the trust game or trust in general
to personality. Two studies relate the Machiavellian personality test
to the trust game: Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, and Smith (2002) use a
modified trust game and Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen (2003) the
standard trust game. Having hypotheses about both trust and trust-
worthiness, related to scoring high on Machiavellism, Gunnthorsdottir,
McCabe, and Smith (2002) find that subjects high on Machiavellism
are less trustworthy, where Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen (2003)
find that high Machiavellism predicts lack of trust, but not trustwor-
thiness.
Fahr and Irlenbusch (2008) use the Big Five personality model,
measured by Catell’s 16 PF-R, to analyze trust between representatives
of organizations. To study this question they use a modified trust game.
To implement their organizational setting players were in groups of four
and had to decide as a representative of their own group. They found a
link between anxiety, being linked to risk averse behavior, and trustor
behavior and anxiety, on the other hand being liked to cooperative
behavior, to trustee’s decision. Our study strengthens the result that
anxiety is linked to distrust. Using another measure of the Big Five
and the standard trust game we find that trust is negatively related to
anxiety (see table 4).
The research focus of Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010) concentrates
on understanding trusting and trustworthiness. They use many differ-
ent measures, and among others the Big Five factors (measured by the
NEO-FFI), but to define trust and trustworthiness they use on the one
hand survey questions and on the other hand a modified trust game (a
repeated variant).
Our exploratory study had two main aims: First, we wanted to test
whether personality variables can be used to predict “micro”-level be-
havior in economic games, where we use the example of the trust game.
Next, we hypothesized that strong situations allow for less influence of
personality factors than weak situations, and that first players in a
trust game are in a weak situation, while second players face a strong
situation.
Our results confirm most of our general and some of the more spe-
cific predictions: First, we do find that personality variables contribute
to an explanation of behavior. Trustor behavior can be explained to a
large extent using personality variables. This is good news especially
for personality psychologists, who so far seldom validate their person-
ality scales with the help of clear-cut behavioral experiments. It is also
good news for all those experimental and behavioral economists that
now start to use personality measures in their experiments. But, we
also confirm the notion of strong and weak situations found in person-
ality psychology: First player’s behavior can be explained to a large
extent (up to 23% of the variance) using personality variables, while
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second player’s behavior is explained by the situation. This is essen-
tially good news for standard economics, as this means that if incentives
or behavioral norms are clear and strongly point into a specific direc-
tion, most people, independent of their personality, will react to these
incentives, and predictably so.
7. Appendix
7.1. Trust Game.
Instructions. These instructions have been translated into English
from the Original German.
In this game you will play together with one other person in the
laboratory. You are either player A or player B. This will be randomly
determined by the computer. The other person (A or B) you will play
together will also be randomly determined by the computer.
Both player A and B receive 10 experimental currency units (ECU).
Player A can decide whether he would like to send taler to player B
and if so, how many (only integer amounts are possible). The amount
of ECU that player A sents to player B is tripled. Therefore player
B receives 3 units for each unit sent by player A. Player B can then
decide whether she wants to return ECU to player A and if so, how
many. These units will not be tripled. This is the end of this game.
The experimental currency is converted into Euros as follows: 1
ECU = 0.30 Euro.
If you now got questions regarding these instructions, raise your
hand and one of the experimenters will come to answer your questions.
7.2. Descriptive Statistics of the Personality Scales. In ta-
ble 7 we show basic descriptive statistics of the Big Five factors.
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of the Personality Scales
Variable n Mean SD Min Max
Neuroticism 126 91.985 23.666 27 155
Extraversion 126 116.020 21.564 32 158
Openness 126 124.478 16.781 72 180
Agreeableness 126 109.925 18.700 67 152
Conscientiousness 126 116.294 21.636 58 166
CHAPTER 4
Can Personality Explain what is Underlying
Women’s Unwillingness to Compete?1
1. Introduction
There is ample evidence that women do not react to competition as
men do and are less willing to enter a competition than men. In their
first laboratory study in this field Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini
(2003) found that men increase performance in competitive environ-
ments more than women do. Following this experiment there are by
now many studies replicating this gender gap in performance and also
the gender gap in entering into competitive environments, e.g., Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007); Croson and Gneezy (2009); Cason, Masters, and
Sheremeta (2010); Dohmen and Falk (2011); Niederle and Vesterlund
(2010); Niederle, Segal, and Vesterlund (2010); Datta Gupta, Poulsen,
and Villeval (2011). Trying to understand this gender gap researchers
studied hormones (Wozniak, Harbaugh, and Mayr (2010)) or social im-
print (Booth and Nolen (2011)). There are replications of the findings
with different age and cultural groups (Gneezy and Rustichini (2004);
Gneezy, Leonard, and List (2009); Dreber, Von Essen, and Ranehill
(2011); Sutter and Ru¨tzler (2010); Andersen et.al. (2011); Ca´rdenas
et.al. (2011)).
To the best of our knowledge no paper thus far has tried to un-
derstand the underlying motives of women to enter a competition less
willingly than men do. One way of doing this is to study personality
variables that are related to performance and achievement. This is the
focus of the current paper.
A recent paper by Almlund et.al. (2011) gives a good overview
of the literature of personality psychology of relevance for economics.
Fietze, Holst, and Tobsch (2011) attempt to explain the gender career
gap by personality. They use SOEP-Data and find evidence that the
personality traits have an influence on the career gap. While the direct
impact is rather small, they discuss the possibility that there is also an
indirect effect.
We study the Big Five personality factors (Goldberg (1981), Mc-
Crae and Costa JR (2003)). We test whether the Big Five are related
1This chapter comprises the paper co-authored with Christiane Schwieren.
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to performance in our experiment, and whether this depends on incen-
tives. We then relate gender differences in personality to the choice of
an incentive system.
We replicate the experiment by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) with
a sample of participants who have filled in various personality question-
naires before coming to the laboratory. In this experiment, subjects can
earn money by solving real-effort tasks (summing up two-digit num-
bers). They start out with a piece-rate payment scheme, followed by a
winner-takes-all competition in groups of four. In a third round, sub-
jects can choose whether they prefer a competitive incentive scheme or
a piece-rate incentive scheme for this round. Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007) report a clear gender difference in choice. Women are less willing
to enter a competition than men, such that — based on performance
-– too few women, but too many men enter the competition.
We can show that the sex difference in our sample can be explained
by a difference in neuroticism. We further show that neuroticism is neg-
atively related to performance in a competitive setting. This raises the
possibility that those women who do not choose competition “know”
that they should not do so, even though their piece rate performance
is high. Our results are a first step towards a clarification of the de-
terminants of the gender difference in preferences for competitive envi-
ronments.
In the remainder of the paper section 2 describes our experimental
design and procedures, in section 3 we explain our research question.
Section 4 reports the results and section 5 concludes with a discussion.
2. Experimental Design
The experiment2 was conducted in the experimental laboratory at
Mannheim University. We had 138 subjects in total (57 male, 70 fe-
male, 11 failed to indicate their sex and thus are not part of the analyses
reported here). We paid subjects at the very end of the larger study
2This experiment is part of a larger study. All subjects participated in two
experimental sessions with one week in-between. A total of 24 sessions were run;
twelve in each week, consisting of different experimental games. We also elicited
the risk attitude of the participants, using the method by Holt and Laury (2002).
The order of the experimental games remained fixed in both weeks over all sessions.
In total, the experiment lasted for about one hour in the first and one hour in the
second week. Subjects had spent about two hours on average for filling in the
personality questionnaires previous to our experimental sessions. Questionnaires
were never filled in directly before or after the experimental sessions. Subjects
knew about the whole timing in advance. At the beginning of each session they
received instructions containing the curse of events of the session. The aim of this
large study is to link personality to decisions in economic games. Because subjects
had to come at least two times to the laboratory, we decided to get the data for all
sub-projects of the study together. We only report data of one of these sub-projects,
namely the tournament game, here.
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(i.e. after the session in the second week). Earnings from the experi-
ments were performance-based, and a fixed fee was paid for filling in
the questionnaires.
The questionnaires were filled in with pen and paper, while the
games were programmed and conducted with the software z-tree (Fis-
chbacher (2007)). For each of the experimental games additional in-
dividual instructions were distributed and read aloud by the experi-
menter. Participants had a chance to ask questions before each new
game.
2.1. Timing. This project is part of our larger study on person-
ality. The data used in this paper was generated in the first week, and
the tournament game was the first game in the session. At the end of
the session we elicited subjects risk attitude with the method of Holt
and Laury (2002).
The personality questionnaires were filled in the week before the
first session in the laboratory.
2.2. The tournament game. For the tournament game3 we fol-
lowed the set-up by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007): participants had
to do a real-effort task which was to add up two-digit numbers. The
allocated time was five minutes and subjects could solve as many prob-
lems as they were able to. Subjects got absolute feedback only after
each sum.
Subjects were told that the game consisted of four parts and that
one of the parts would be randomly chosen for payment.
In each of the four rounds subjects had to do the same real-effort
task. In the first round participants were paid with a piece-rate pay-
ment scheme, and in the second round in a competitive incentive scheme
(winner-takes-it-all-tournament), then they had to choose the incentive
scheme they preferred for the third round. In a final step they could
decide to submit their performance in the piece-rate part to compet-
itive pay. For competitive pay subjects played randomly matched4 in
groups of four. For our analyses, we focus only on the first decision,
whether to enter a competition in round three or not.5
The exact rewards were 0.5e for each correct answer in the piece-
rate compensation scheme, and in the tournament compensation scheme
3For translated instructions see appendix 6.1.
4Here is a difference to the design of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) were
subjects also competed in groups of four, but there were always two male and two
female participants in a group. As we made sure that we always had mixed-gender
groups in the lab, subjects could believe that they might compete against both
sexes.
5Very few subjects submitted their piece-rate performance to competition.
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the subject who solved most sums received 2e for each correct answer,
all others got nothing.
There was no relative feedback given during the game, but subjects
learned for each sum they calculated whether it was wrong or correct
and could furthermore always track the number of correct and incorrect
answers they had given so far.
After all rounds had been played, participants were asked to indi-
cate how they would rank themselves compared to their group of four
in part 1 (piece-rate) and part 2 (forced competition). They had to give
their exact position in their group, that is first, second, third or fourth.
The accuracy of this ranking was incentivized, subjects received 1e for
each correct ranking.
2.3. Risk measure. To measure risk aversion we use the method
developed by Holt and Laury (2002). Subjects had to make a series
of ten choices between two risky lotteries. The consequences of the
two lotteries were always the same: 2.00e or 1.60e for lottery A, and
3.85e or 0.10e for lottery B. The probabilities for these consequences
were always the same for both lotteries, ranging from 1/10 probability
for the higher payoff in the first choice up to a probability of 1 in the
last choice, so the probability shifts from the lower to the higher payoff.
While subjects should choose lottery A in the first choices, a more risk
averse person should switch to lottery B later than a less risk averse
person. Payoffs for each subject were determined by randomly choosing
one of the ten choices to be paid out.
We use the switching point from Lottery A to lottery B to measure
risk aversion – where later switching points correspond to higher risk
aversion.
Most of our subjects6 are consistent, in the sense that they have a
unique switching point from lottery A to lottery B. Inconsistency, that
is multiple switching, happens only in 6 out of our 127 cases (4.7%).
2.4. Measurement of personality: The Big Five. To measure
personality we use the five-factor model or the “Big Five” (Goldberg
(1981), McCrae and Costa JR (2003)). This model organizes personal-
ity traits in five basic dimensions: neuroticism, extraversion, openness
to experience, agreeableness and conscientiousness.7 A list of the per-
sonality dimensions and sub-dimensions measured by the Big Five scale
we use can be found in table 1.
6Unfortunately, there was a computer problem, therefore we do not have the
risk measure for all subjects: for 127 of our subjects we have the switching point,
for 12 we do not.
7There are other labels for the five factors, we use the names by Costa and
McCrae (1992).
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Table 1. The five factors (Costa and McCrae (1992))
Neuroticism Anxiety, Hostility, Depression, Self-
Consciousness, Impulsiveness, Vulnera-
bility to Stress
Extraversion Warmth, Gregariousness, Assertiveness,
Activity, Excitement-Seeking, Positive
Emotion
Openness to Experience Fantasy, Aesthetics, Feelings, Actions,
Ideas, Values
Agreeableness Trust, Straightforwardness, Altru-
ism, Compliance, Modesty, Tender-
Mindedness
Conscientiousness Competence, Order, Dutifulness,
Achievement-Striving, Self-Discipline,
Deliberation
In general, psychological scales to measure personality are derived
by various approaches. One consists of using lists of adjectives that are
thought to be able to describe personality (Allport and Odbert (1936)).
Another approach uses questionnaire data and, with the help of factor-
analytic methods, derives traits from the collection of questionnaire
items (see Norman (1963), Funder (2001)). Both approaches are rather
method-driven than theory-driven. The Big Five Personality Factors
that have been derived using a combination of both of these methods
(McCrae and Costa Jr. (1987), John and Srivastava (1999)) have been
proven to be useful in an empirical sense.
We use the NEO PI-R (Costa and McCrae (1992)), German version
(Ostendorf and Angleitner (2004)) to measure the Big Five personality
factors. It consists of 241 items rated on a 5-point-Likert-scale.
From these items one constructs a measure for each of the five
factors, which we use for our analysis. In the following, we refer to
these variables with the name of the factor, neuroticism, extraversion,
openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness.
3. Research question
To explain the gender difference found in competitive environments
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) thought about a personal characteristic,
risk attitude, as a predictor. The idea was that gender differences in risk
attitude could at least partly explain gender differences in competition.
In a review Eckel and Grossman (2008) show that most studies find that
women are more risk averse than men. But Niederle and Vesterlund
4. RESULTS 66
(2007) find gender differences in risk aversion to play a negligible role
in the explanation of the effect that women avoid competition.
In a similar vein we consider a more general concept of personality,
measured by the five factor model. Research in personality psychol-
ogy revealed gender differences in some of the Big Five factors. In
a meta-analysis Feingold (1994) found that women score higher than
men on extraversion, anxiety (sub-factor of neuroticism), trust and
tender-mindedness (sub-factors of agreeableness). In a cross-cultural
study Costa Jr., Terracciano, and McCrae (2001) conclude that women
score higher on neuroticism, agreeableness, warmth (sub-factor of ex-
traversion) and openness to feelings (sub-factor of openness). Schmitt
et.al. (2008) report gender differences in personality variables in 49 na-
tions. They also asses the five personality factors, using the Big Five
Inventory (BFI). They find that women score higher on neuroticism,
agreeableness, extraversion and conscientiousness. Regarding neuroti-
cism they state that in no country men reported significantly more
neuroticism than women.
In this paper we address the question whether part of the gender
differences in competition can be explained by personality. Knowing
that men and women differ in personality variables raised the con-
jecture that maybe personality mediates the gender difference in the
choice to compete. If personality as a broader concept has an influence
on behavior in competitive environments it is moreover interesting to
know which of the Big Five factors affects behavior most.
4. Results
4.1. Gender Differences in Competitive Settings – Repli-
cation. To relate our paper to the literature in the field, we first test
whether we can replicate the basic results of Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007).
Table 2. Gender differences in choice of incentives
choice frequency percent
Women piece rate 52 74.3
tournament 18 25.7
total 70 100
Men piece rate 33 57.9
tournament 24 42.1
total 57 100
The first question is whether we also find gender differences in the
choice of competitive incentives.8 Table 2 shows that 25.7% of women
8For an overview please find a table with variable explanations in appendix 6.2.
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choose to compete in round 3, compared to 42.1% of men. This gender
difference is (marginally) significant (chi square test χ2 = 3.813, p =
.051).
We have to keep in mind however that it might be rational for
women not to choose competition, if they indeed perform worse than
men in the task. Table 3 shows that the baseline performance in the
task is the same for both genders: Performance in the piece-rate pay-
ment scheme is not significantly different between men and women.
But women perform significantly worse than men in forced competition,
even though they improve their performance from piece-rate to com-
petition just as men do (two sample Mann-Whitney-U-tests on perfor-
mance PR z = 1.518, p = .129, performance FC z = 2.169, p = .028,
improvement z = 1.139, p = .254).
Table 3. Performance of men and women
sex n mean SD
Performance PR female 70 9.96 3.78
male 57 11.16 4.51
Performance FC female 70 12.14 4.57
male 57 14.02 5.10
Improvement (FC – PR) female 70 2.19 3.24
male 57 2.86 4.11
Using the same kind of simulation as Niederle and Vesterlund do,
we determine at which performance level a subject should rationally
enter the competition. We do not distinguish between men and women
here, because our set-up was a bit different from that of Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007).9
Our simulation indicates that someone solving 14 sums correctly
should be (nearly) indifferent between entering the competition or not
(having a 24.54% chance to win when entering the competition), while
someone solving 15 sums should always enter the competition (having
a 32.74% chance to win).
In contrast to Niederle and Vesterlund’s findings, in our sample,
there are as many women as men who do not enter the competition
while they should (65.4% of women vs. 55.2% of men, chi square test
χ2 = .596, p = .440). For those who enter while they should not we do
however find the same sex difference Niederle and Vesterlund found:
9We had randomly composed groups, ensuring that always both men and
women were in the laboratory. In Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) there were al-
ways equal numbers of women and men in the laboratory and two women and two
men competing in a group. We had groups of at least 8 subjects in the laboratory
with a random composition of sex. Except once, there were always at least 25% of
the minority sex in the lab (in one session only 22%), and competing groups were
composed randomly.
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Marginally significantly more men than women enter a competition
while they should not (20.5% of women vs. 39.3% of men, chi square
test χ2 = 3.025, p = .082).
4.2. Performance and choice. We now test whether those choos-
ing competition differ in “substantial” variables from those not choos-
ing competition, i.e., we test for differences in performance in piece rate
and forced competition and the difference in improvement from piece
rate to competition. As subjects also indicated which rank they believe
to hold in forced competition, we can test for differences in performance
beliefs between those who choose competition in round three and those
who do not. We do this first for all participants together, and then
split the data by gender to study differences between the sexes.
Table 4. Differences in performance by choice of incen-
tive scheme
choice n mean SD
performance PR piece-rate 85 10.16 3.99
competition 42 11.17 4.44
performance FC piece-rate 85 12.45 4.55
competition 42 14.07 5.39
improvement piece-rate 85 2.28 3.94
competition 42 2.90 3.01
Table 4 shows performance in piece-rate and forced competition
and improvement between those two treatments for those who do and
those who do not choose competition. Even though those who choose
competition perform slightly better on average than those who choose
piece rate in both treatments, and improve slightly more, only the
difference in forced competition is marginally significant (two sample
Mann-Whitney-U-tests piece-rate: z = −1.219, p = .223; forced com-
petition: z = −1.757, p = .079; improvement: z = −1.272, p = .272).
The most important difference we do find is the belief subjects hold
about their performance in forced competition. Those subjects who
later do choose competition have significantly more “positive” perfor-
mance beliefs than those who do not choose competition (univariate
ANOVA, F-test: F = 6.886, p = .000).
We now turn to the analysis of gender differences. First, we look at
the performance variables and compare separately for men and women
performance in piece rate and forced competition, and improvement be-
tween those who do and who do not choose competition in round three.
Then, we look at performance beliefs of men and women who choose/do
not choose competition. Even though those who choose competition
perform slightly better both in piece-rate and in forced competition,
and also improve more from piece-rate to forced competition, neither
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Table 5. Differences in performance by gender
performance
choice piece rate tournament improvement
Women piece rate 9.56 11.67 2.11
(3.71) (4.16) (3.57)
tournament 11.11 13.50 2.39
(5.10) (5.49) (2.09)
Men piece rate 11.12 13.67 2.54
(4.92) (4.94) (4.50)
tournament 11.21 14.50 3.29
(4.00) (5.39) (3.54)
Note: averages with standard deviation in parenthesis.
for men nor for women separately any of these differences is significant
(see table 5).
Table 6. Self-Ranking in forced competition and performance
measure self ranking n mean SD min max
FC
performance FC 1 42 16.19 4.71 7 29
2 43 12.44 4.01 4 19
3 33 11.73 3.29 6 20
4 9 5.22 2.22 3 10
total 127 12.98 4.89 3 29
improvement from 1 42 4.24 3.03 -1.00 11.00
piece rate to 2 43 2.30 3.42 -6.00 11.00
competition 3 33 1.76 3.53 -8.00 8.00
4 9 -2.11 3.14 -8.00 1.00
total 127 2.49 3.66 -8.00 11.00
Performance beliefs however differ both for men and women sig-
nificantly between those who do and those who do not choose com-
petition (univariate ANOVA: Women: F = 12.936, p = .001; Men:
F = 4.325, p = .042). In table 6 one can see that these performance
beliefs (self-ranking in forced competition) are overall related to real
performance: For each performance measure applied, those ranking
themselves highest indeed perform best, while those ranking themselves
lowest indeed perform worst.
4.3. The Impact of the Big Five Factors. We now turn to
our main research question, whether personality can explain (choice)
behavior in the tournament game.
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4.3.1. Personality and Performance. We first analyze whether per-
sonality factors are linked to performance. To test whether this is the
case for our sample, we correlate performance in all three rounds with
the values in the personality variables we study. Table 8 shows the
correlations.
We can see in table 8 that openness to experience is negatively re-
lated to performance in the piece-rate setting, but not to performance
in the forced competition setting. Neuroticism is marginally signifi-
cantly negatively related to performance in the forced competition set-
ting and highly significantly negatively related to performance in the
choice setting, while openness to experience is marginally significantly
negatively related to performance in the choice setting. A relationship
between performance and some of the Big Five factors, especially open-
ness to experience for piece-rate and the choice setting and neuroticism
for forced competition and the choice setting could thus be established.
Table 7. Gender differences for personality factors
sex n mean SD SE Mean
neuroticism female 66 99.17 21.31 2.62
male 54 84.76 24.93 3.39
extraversion female 66 120.39 17.58 2.16
male 54 111.78 24.54 3.34
openness female 66 128.44 15.45 1.90
male 54 119.98 17.70 2.41
agreeableness female 66 109.76 19.94 2.45
male 54 109.68 17.49 2.38
conscientiousness female 66 117.30 21.83 2.69
male 54 114.70 22.08 3.01
We now test whether we can replicate the gender differences in the
personality variables reported in the literature. Two-sample t-tests10
show that there are indeed gender differences in some of the person-
ality variables in our sample. Women score significantly higher on
neuroticism (t = 3.424, p = .001), significantly higher on extraversion
(t = 2.235, p = .027), and significantly higher on openness to experi-
ence (t = 2.795, p = .006). These differences have also been mentioned
in the literature (see 3).
4.3.2. Personality and Choice. It is noteworthy here that those per-
sonality factors where women, on average, score higher than men, have
a negative impact on performance in a competitive (neuroticism) or
a piece-rate (openness) setting. Therefore, in the following we test
10Using visual tests and also the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality, we
can show that for all five factors scores in the Big Five personality variables are
normally distributed. Therefore we use t-tests for our analysis.
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Table 8. Correlations
perf PR perf FC perf R3 N E O A
perf FC .684***
(.000)
127
perf R3 679*** .855***
(.000) (.000)
127 127
N -.052 -.154* -.230**
(.570) (.094) (.011)
120 120 120
E -.029 .024 -.013 -.279***
(.755) (.756) (.892) (.002)
120 120 120 126
O -.217** -.149 -.156* .024 .341***
(.017) (.104) (.090) (.789) (.000)
120 120 120 126 126
A -.105 -.123 -.125 -.158* .173 .064
(.252) (.181) (.174) (.077) (.053) (.477)
120 120 120 126 126 126
C -.069 .046 .073 -.259** .167* -.067 -.037
(.452) (.616) (.430) (.003) (.062) (.456) (.677)
120 120 120 126 126 126 126
Note: coefficients, significance and number of observations. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Abbreviations: perf
= performance, PR = piece-rate, FC = forced competition, R3 = round 3
(choice), N = neuroticism, E = extraversion, O = openness to experience,
A=agreeableness, C = conscientiousness.
whether women “know”11 that they have certain characteristics that
do not help them in a competitive environment and therefore stay out
of a competition; i.e., we test whether the gender difference in person-
ality variables disappears for those women who chose to compete.
Table 9 shows that this is indeed the case: While for women and
men who do not choose to compete in round three, the gender difference
in neuroticism is highly significant (two-sample t-test t = 2.787, p =
.008), there is no significant difference between men and women who do
choose to compete. This does not hold for openness, where there is a
marginally significant difference for those who do not choose to compete
and a significant difference for those who do compete. Remember,
however, that openness mainly influenced performance in a piece-rate
11With this “know” we refer to knowledge in the sense that a person knows
about its own characteristics and personality, and thus knows in what kind of
situations he or she is successful and confident or not, and therefore decides to
enter or to avoid that kind of situation. Recent research in psychology comes to
the conclusion that we are not perfectly aware of our own personality, but at least
we know ourselves quite well, see Vazire and Carlson (2010), Wilson (2009).
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Table 9. Gender differences by choice of competition
sex n mean SD SE mean
no neuroticism female 50 101.72 22.64 3.20
male 31 86.77 24.74 4.44
openness female 50 127.22 13.93 1.97
male 31 120.48 19.24 3.45
risk attitude female 50 6.64 1.86 .26
male 32 6.75 1.72 .30
yes neuroticism female 16 91.19 14.28 3.57
male 23 82.04 25.47 5.31
openness female 16 132.25 19.49 4.87
male 23 119.30 15.78 3.29
risk attitude female 15 6.40 1.30 .33
male 24 5.87 1.39 .28
setting negatively and thus, it might be rational to avoid piece-rate
settings when scoring high on openness.
For comparison we include risk attitude here, as this has been stud-
ied by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). We measured risk attitude with
the method developed by Holt and Laury (2002). We see that no signif-
icant differences in risk attitude exist between the sexes and for those
choosing or avoiding competition. Also, for the following regression re-
sults, in line with the findings in the literature, including risk aversion
does not change our results.
4.3.3. Neuroticism and the Rationality of the Decision to Enter. As
we calculated whether subjects should rationally enter the competition
we use this measure to compare the scores in neuroticism for subjects
that should rationally enter the competition, but in reality do not enter,
and also subjects that entered the competition, but rationally should
not enter. For the latter subjects we find no difference in the neu-
roticism score. Subjects who should rationally enter the competition
but do not, score significantly higher on neuroticism (two-sample t-test
t = −2.081, p = .043). This again confirms our result that high neu-
roticism scores have a negative influence on the willingness to compete,
even for potential high performers and both for women and men.
4.3.4. The Influence of Personality on the Choice to Compete. In
the following, we run regressions to test the robustness of the results
so far reported and to test whether we can establish that neuroticism
mediates the gender difference both in performance and in choice.
We explain the choice of competitive incentives in round 3, using
a binary logistic regression, where we enter as explanatory variables
in a first step sex alone, in a second step additionally all five person-
ality factors, and in a third step more ”substantial” measures: the
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number of correct answers in piece-rate (round 1) as a baseline perfor-
mance measure, self-ranking in forced competition and improvement
from piece-rate to tournament. The coefficients can be found in table
10.
In all the following regressions we will use performance PR, the
number of correct answers in the first round with the piece-rate incen-
tive scheme, as basic performance measure. We decided to use this
measure as our baseline measure, because the measure performance
FC (forced competition) is already in a competitive setting and thus
is at least potentially influenced by the same factors that influence
performance in round 3. Therefore, especially for the regression on
performance in round 3, we decided to use performance PR.12
Table 10. Logistic regression (I) on the choice to enter
a competition
(I-1) (I-2) (I-3)
sex -.182∗∗ -.100 -.131
(.085/.033) (.097/.306) (.099/.184)
neuroticism -.005∗∗ -.004∗
(.002/.032) (.002/.072)
extraversion -.003 -.003
(.002/.151) (.002/.130)
openness .002 .005∗
(.003/.460) (.003/.060)
agreeableness .000 .000
(.002/.877) (.002/.886)
conscientiousness -.002 .001
(.002/.447) (.002/.938)
performance PR .004
(.012/.708)
self-ranking FC -.260∗∗∗
(.064/.000)
improvement -.022
(.015/.134)
Pseudo R2 .03 .06 .21
n 120 120 120
Note: marginal effects at the mean with standard errors/p-values in parenthe-
sis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
One can see in table 10 that sex alone does predict the choice (I-1),
but it is mediated by neuroticism: The effect of sex disappears when we
include neuroticism (and the other personality factors) in the regression
(I-2). In step I-3, when we include more variables, neuroticism remains
12But our results are robust, nothing substantial changes when we use perfor-
mance in forced competition instead of performance in piece-rate as the baseline
performance.
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marginally significant, openness is as well marginally significant, and
the self-ranking of the subject in forced competiton becomes the main
and highly significant predictor of choice of competitive incentives.
To be more precise about the mediating effect of neuroticism we
further did a mediation analysis following Baron and Kenny (1986).
The first two steps are already included in table 10: in the first re-
gression model (I-1) we see that sex is a significant predictor for the
choice to compete, but is not significant in the second model (I-2)
when the mediator neuroticism and the other personality factors are
added in. Then we calculate the indirect effect which is the product
of the coefficient for neuroticism on sex and the coefficient for choice
on neuroticism. Using bootstrapping with 5,000 replications we find a
significant indirect effect (p = 0.042).
4.3.5. Performance Beliefs. To analyze the influence of performance
beliefs on the choice to compete and on our results regarding neuroti-
cism we correlate the five personality factors with self-ranking in piece-
rate and self-ranking in forced competition. But neither neuroticism
nor any other personality factor is significantly correlated to any of our
measured beliefs.
Using actual performance in forced competition and the belief about
performance in forced competition instead of the combination of perfor-
mance in piece-rate and self-ranking in forced competition, and running
the same regression as the third model in table 10 leads structurally to
the same results: self-ranking FC is highly significant.
We define a subject as overconfident when the self-estimated rank is
higher than the actual rank and underconfident when the self-estimated
rank is lower than the actual (we do not categorize those subjects
who guessed the correct rank). We find that overconfident subjects
have significant lower neuroticism scores than underconfident subjects
(two-sample t-test t = 2.371, p = .020). This fits well with the fact
that overconfidence is connected with more entry into the competition
and with the fact that subjects scoring high on neuroticism avoid the
competitive situation.
4.3.6. The Influence of Personality on Performance in Competi-
tion. We now turn to analyze the influence of personality on perfor-
mance, where we examine performance in both types of competition:
forced competition in round two and self-selected competition in round
three. Beginning with forced competiton we run a regression with per-
formance FC (the number of correct answers in forced competition)
as dependent variable, and we enter sex in a first step as explanatory
variable, then additionally all five personality factors, in a third step
we add performance in piece rate (round 1), and finally we also include
interaction terms. The coefficients can be found in table 11.
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Table 11. Regression (II) on performance in forced competition
(II-1) (II-2) (II-3) (II-4)
sex -.215∗∗ -.176∗ -.123 -.131∗
(.899/.020) (.974/.078) (.765/.117) (.771/.097)
neuroticism -.089 -.062 .150
(.021/.388) (.015/.396) (.031/.331)
extraversion .101 .039 .051
(.022/.302) (.019/.632) (.019/.550)
openness -.130 .023 .011
(.028/.180) (.024/.783) (.024/.898)
agreeableness -.146 -.067 -.074
(.023/.106) (.017/.310) (.017/.271)
conscientiousness .002 .076 .069
(.021/.983) (.018/.354) (.018/.403)
performance PR .665∗∗∗ .960∗∗∗
(.089/.000) (.229/.000)
performance PR * -.366∗
neuroticism (.002/.095)
n 120 120 120 120
R2 .046 .091 .497 .505
adj. R2 .038 .043 .466 .469
Note: standardized coefficients β with robust standard errors/p-values in
parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
We find a gender effect on performance in forced competition (II-1),
which reduces to marginally significant when the Big Five factors are in-
cluded. None of the five factors gets significant separately, but neuroti-
cism does have a (nonsignificant) negative effect on performance. In-
cluding performance in the piece-rate payment scheme into the regres-
sion (II-3) explains performance in the competitive payment scheme.
In (II-4) we also include the interaction term between performance in
piece-rate and neuroticism. This is additionally significant, and gender
again is marginally significant.
We finally run a regression with the number of correct answers
in round three as dependent variable. We enter again as explanatory
variable in a first step sex, then additionally all five personality factors,
in the third step we include the number of correct answers in piece-rate
and the choice to enter the competition, and again include interaction
terms. The coefficients can be found in table 12.
When we analyze performance in round three we again find that
the effect of sex disappears when we include the Big Five factors.
Here, neuroticism gets significant and agreeableness marginally signif-
icant. Having chosen a payment scheme seems to impact performance
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Table 12. Regression (III) on performance in round 3
(III-1) (III-2) (III-3) (IV-4)
sex .206∗∗ .117 .057 -.071
(.877/.027) (.960/.248) (.757/.475) (.748/.367)
neuroticism -.210∗∗ -.167∗∗ .153
(.020/.049) (.014/.025) (.029/.291)
extraversion .011 -.040 -.025
(.019/.896) (.018/.625) (.018/.759)
openness -.116 .030 .013
(.024/.188) (.019/.659) (.019/.840)
agreeableness -.152∗ -.075 -.084
(.021/.069) (.016/.238) (.016/.183)
conscientiousness .010 .088 .077
(.019/.907) (.017/.257) (.017/.325)
performance PR .658∗∗∗ 1.113∗∗∗
(.082/.000) (.216/.000)
performance PR * -.560∗∗∗
neuroticism (.002/.005)
choice to compete .068 .051
(.681/.315) (.698/.459)
n 120 120 120 120
R2 .042 .110 .525 .541
adj. R2 .034 .063 .491 .504
Note: standardized coefficients β with robust standard errors/p-values in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
of those negatively who are highly neurotic, independent of the pay-
ment scheme chosen. When performance in piece-rate and the choice
to enter the competition are included, performance in the piece-rate
setting together with neuroticism remain significant predictors of per-
formance. Wen we finally include the interaction between neuroticism
and performance, we find than neuroticism is no longer significant,
while perfomance PR still is and also the interaction has a significant
negative influence.
Overall this confirms the intuition we got earlier: It is generally not
women who do not self-select in the competitive treatment, but those
(women) who score high on neuroticism - maybe knowing that this will
negatively impact their performance in a competitive setting.13
5. Discussion
We study gender differences with respect to the choice of competi-
tive incentive schemes and to performance in competiton in relation to
13One could in principal test this with the choice in round 4, but we had hardly
anybody choosing to submit his or her piece-rate performance to competition.
5. DISCUSSION 77
personality variables on a behavioral level. By and large, we succeed in
replicating the findings by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), even if our
setting is slightly less controlled in terms of gender composition of the
competing groups. While in their case, subjects could see that there
were always two women and two men in a group, in our case subjects
only knew the gender composition of the whole group in the lab, with
considerable variance thereof. Even though, we do find that women
enter the competition less frequently than men do, and men enter the
competition significantly more often if they should not than women
do. In contrast to Niederle and Vesterlund, we do find an overall sex
difference in performance in the competitive part and in part three of
the game, and we do not find a difference between men and women
with respect to not entering the competition when they ought to.
Our focus is however not on the choice of an incentive scheme per
se, but on personality factors underlying this choice. Our results show
that there is one of the Big Five personality variables, neuroticism, that
is related to performance in and choice of a competitive context.
Neuroticism represents the tendency to be anxious, insecure and
emotionally unstable in general, and to be susceptible to be stressed
or depressed (McCrae and John (1992), Hogan and Johnson (1997)).
In a meta-analysis looking at the link between personality and psycho-
logical disorders, Kotovet.al. (2010) found neuroticism to be related to
post-traumatic stress disorder and major depression. High neuroticism
is the key characteristic of burnout ( Langelaan et.al. (2006), Kim,
Shin, and Swanger (2009)). Neuroticism is, among others linked with
difficulties in coping with conflicts and distress (Bolger and Schilling
(1991), Bolger and Zuckerman (1995)). It has also been associated
with impaired academic performance (e.g., Chamorro-Premuzic and
Furnham (2003), Heaven et.al. (2002)). In a large study with about
1,000 truck drivers Andersson et.al. (2010) found that in the integra-
tion between personality theory and economic preferences intelligence
and neuroticism play the major role.
So it seems intuitive, that people scoring high on neuroticism per-
form worse in a competitive setting than more emotionally stable sub-
jects, and that they fear the stress involved and rather stay out of
competitive settings.
As women on average score higher on neuroticism than men, one
should expect women to enter a competition less often than men do,
and to perform worse when they are forced into a competitive set-
ting. Our findings corroborate this: Those women who do enter a
competition score lower on neuroticism than women who do not enter
a competition, and equal to average men. Low neuroticism women thus
self-select in competitive environments, while the others stay out. Men
seem to be less influenced by these factors, maybe scoring just “low
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enough” in general (they indeed score (non-significantly) lower than
even women who do chose competition).
In our study we used as real-effort task a math task, adding two-
digit numbers. Regarding performance differences of men and women,
research on gender differences could establish only a few tasks were real
differences in the performance of men and women could be observed
(see e.g. Kimura (1999), Kimura (2004)). Summation is not among
them, even if other mathematical tasks are.
While performance differences are not always and unequivocal found,
stereotypes about performance of women and men in different tasks ex-
ist and have shown to affect behavior (see, e.g., Gu¨nther et.al. (2010),
Grosse and Riener (2010), Dreber, Von Essen, and Ranehill (2011)).
The notion stereotype threat captures the phenomenon that activation
of a stereotype impairs perfomance of subjects of the negatively stereo-
typed group (Steele and Aronson (1995); Steele (1997)). We could
imagine that this stereotype threat works intensified for women with
high neuroticism scores.
We can however only speculate about the influence of neuroticism
if we would use another task. As we do find some relation between
underconfidence and neuroticism, it might be that a stereotypically
female task would have led to other results, but we cannot say whether
underconfidence is task-specific or not.
Since we also found that neuroticism has a negative impact on per-
formance, and thereby on the choice to enter a competition we might
equally well expect the same picture with a more stereotypically female
task, as neuroticism could also be an obstacle in competitive situations
per se. But as this is highly speculative, further research should address
this question!
What do our results imply in a more general sense? It seems to be
not being male or being female per se that influences whether someone
likes to enter a competition or not. Rather, there are certain individual
characteristics influencing performance in and preference for competi-
tive settings which are stronger related with one gender than the other.
Those scoring high on these characteristics rationally avoid competitive
settings and those scoring low enough seek such settings. If we under-
stand how these characteristics can be influenced, we might, rather
than simply encouraging women to be more competitive, try to focus
on these characteristics during education. Developing them in women
equally as in men should be the more successful approach to achiev-
ing gender equality. Personality traits can change during lifetime, as
has been shown by Roberts (2009); Roberts and Mroczek (2008). For
women, there is evidence that personality changes through work expe-
rience (Roberts (1997)).
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Encouraging women to enter a competition despite them being high
on emotional instability might just provoke failure and thus reinforce
the stereotype and discourage other women to follow suit.
Analyzing occupational attainment and relative wages Cobb-Clark
and Tan (2010) conclude “our results document that women are much
more likely to enter some and avoid other occupations than men with
the same cognitive and non-cognitive skills. To what extent is this the
result of differences in either preferences or skills that have we failed
to measure?”. With our results we can explain part of the gender gap
by differences in personality, namely neuroticism.
Our paper represents just a first step towards a deeper understand-
ing of the causes for women’s lower willingness to compete. It shows
in our view that looking for personality factors underlying the gender
differences in economic behavior is a promising avenue, asking for more
studies in the future.
6. Appendix
6.1. Tournament game.
Instructions. 14 In this game you will get math problems where you
have to add numbers. You will receive money only for correct answers
to these problems. For your calculations you are not allowed to use a
calculator, but you can use scratch paper which lies on your desk.
You will be in a group with three other participants in the labo-
ratory. We will randomly build these groups of four. You will at no
point in time be informed, with whom you are in a group.
This game is divided in four parts. For each part you will get the
instructions for that part at the monitor.
Payment. At the end of the experiment you will get paid for one
of the four parts of the game. We will randomly determine which part
is to be paid and tell you at the end of the experiment.
Generally there are two different kinds of payment: piece-rate pay-
ment and tournament. If the payment is piece-rate payment you will
receive e0.50 per correct answer. In a tournament the winner in a
group is the participant who solves the largest number of correct an-
swers. The winner receives e2 per correct answer, all other participants
in the group get no payment. In case of a tie, the profit is equally split
between the winners.
In each part of the game you will be informed at the monitor which
kind of payment there is in that part.
If you now got questions regarding these instructions, please raise
your hand. One of the experimenters will come to answer your question.
14These instructions have been translated into English from the Original
German.
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6.2. Variables Used. Table 13 gives an overview of the variables
used in the section 4; you can find name and a very short description.
Table 13. Variable Explanation
Name Description
Neuroticism score in NEO-PR-I (Big Five)
Extraversion score in NEO-PR-I
Openness score in NEO-PR-I
Agreeableness score in NEO-PR-I
Conscientiousness score in NEO-PR-I
Risk switching point (Holt & Laury)
Self-ranking PR estimated rank in piece-rate (round 1)
∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
Self-ranking FC estimated rank in forced competition (round 2)
∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
Performance PR number of correct answers in piece-rate
Performance FC number of correct answers in forced competition
Improvement improvement from piece-rate to competiton
Choice to compete whether or not a subject choose to compete
in round 3
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